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Competent Persons' Constitutional Right to
Refuse Medical Treatment in the U.S. and
Japan: Application to Japanese Law
Naoki Kanaboshi*
I. Introduction ""
The goal of this article is to clarify the meaning and scope of the
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment in Japan. Once clarified,
the constitutional right to refuse treatment could govern the interpretation
and application of relevant statutes in certain situations. This thesis
posits that the right to refuse treatment is protected under Article 13 of
the Japanese Constitution, and that Japanese law must be consistent with
the protection of this right.
According to scholars of Japanese constitutional law, the Japanese
Constitution protects certain kinds of self-determination. Just as the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects certain rights
which are not enumerated in the Constitution, Article 13 of the Japanese
Constitution also protects some unenumerated rights. Most
constitutional law scholars agree that Article 13 protects a spectrum of
activity encompassed within "the right to self-determination." Those
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acts of self-determination that are important for personhood enjoy a high
degree of protection.' Although an increasing number of constitutional
scholars agree that the right to refuse medical treatment is a
constitutional right, the discussion stops there and there seems little
exploration on what this right means and requires. The lack of the
recognition of the concrete meaning and scope of this right has arguably
prevented it from being properly invoked outside of the discussions of
constitutional law scholars. When leading criminal law scholars consider
the criminality of a physician's accepting her patient's refusal of life-
sustaining treatment, they seem to do so without considering the
consistency of their arguments with the Constitution. Even when they
mention this constitutional right, their arguments seem to allow the right
to be easily outweighed by the government's countervailing interests.2
This article attempts to rectify this deficiency by showing the
justifications for and scope of the right to refuse treatment under the
Constitution of Japan. This article finds that this right generally prevails
over significant state interests. It also finds that a patient's life-
expectancy or prognosis is not relevant to whether the right may be
exercised, at least when the patient is competent. This article concludes
that Japanese criminal law theories are too restrictive of the right to
refuse treatment; therefore, they are not consistent with Article 13 and
should be modified accordingly.
Part II of this article examines the basis of the constitutional
protection of the right to refuse medical treatment. The discussion that
has taken place in the United States about this right reveals that the right
to refuse treatment, including life-sustaining treatment, is based on the
value of autonomy in authoring one's life, as well as the value of bodily
integrity.
Part III considers the scope of the constitutional right to refuse
treatment. It examines the American courts' attitude toward the state's
countervailing interests and concludes that the constitutional right to
refuse treatment generally outweighs the state interests. It finds, above
all, that a competent patient's constitutional right to refuse treatment is
protected regardless of the patient's life-expectancy or prognosis, and
that refusal of treatment is not attempted suicide.
Part IV applies this right to Japanese law. It shows that this right is
applicable to Japanese law through Article 13 of the Constitution of
Japan, an article that has a role similar to the Due Process Clause. It
critiques the arguments that have been offered against this constitutional
right and that are inconsistent with the scope of the constitutional
1. See infra Part V.A.I.
2. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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protection of this right.
Although the discussion in this article may serve as a basis for
further exploration with respect to the possibility of similar constitutional
protection for certain incompetent persons, this article limits its focus to
competent persons.
II. The Constitutional Right to Refuse Medical Treatment in the
United States
The right to refuse medical treatment in the United States finds firm
support in court precedent, as well as in moral and legal theories
provided by commentators. This Part of the article explains two
theoretical bases of this right: (i) autonomy in authoring one's life and
(ii) autonomy in controlling one's body.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides,
"No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."3 The substantive due process doctrine
holds that some rights that are not explicitly written in the Constitution
still are granted substantive protection under this Clause. It has been
explained that such rights constitute "liberty" in the text of this Clause.
As such, these rights are often called "liberty interests.
' 4
Under the U.S. Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects both types of autonomy
from state action but in separate lines of case law. Those cases that
involve interests such as child rearing, procreation, abortion, and intimate
relationships justify constitutional protection for these interests based
upon the first kind of autonomy, autonomy in authoring one's life. These
protected interests are often described as fully with the scope of the
"right to privacy." Section A explains that constitutional protection for
the refusal of medical treatment, particularly the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment, is justified as autonomy in one's life.
The second kind of autonomy, bodily autonomy, also referred to as
bodily freedom, means freedom to choose whether to accept outer
control of or invasion into one's body. The Due Process Clause
substantively protects this interest as well. The right to refuse medical
treatment is freedom from unwanted medical control or invasion into
one's body.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990) ("a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) ("a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs"); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (calling substantive rights under the Due
Process Clause "fundamental rights and liberty interests").
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A. Personal Autonomy in Authoring One's Life
The Supreme Court has clarified that the Due Process Clause
protects autonomy in authoring one's life. This kind of autonomous
decision making can be rephrased as autonomous life choices, choices
allowing for a person to be the "maker or author of his own life,"5 or as
autonomous choices that allow people "to lead their lives out of a
distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of what is important to
and for them.",6 An individual's status as the author of her own life gives
her identity and personhood.7
This Section shows that the value of autonomy in authoring one's
life justifies the constitutional protection of the right to refuse medical
treatment, especially refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment, and that
the Due Process Clause protects such choices.
1. Precedent
Constitutional protection of autonomy in authoring one's life
overlaps with the history of the right to privacy. The right to privacy
stems from a famous article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis8 describing the right to privacy as "the right to be let alone." 9
In this 1890 article, the authors proposed the notion of the right to
privacy as the motivating force underlying such traditionally protected
interests as an individual's right to prevent disclosure of information
relating to his or her personal affairs, his or her right to control the use of
his image, and an author's right to control his or her personal intellectual
product. In this article, the authors explained the protection of a person's
private information in terms of importance to her personhood.
Specifically, this article argued for the need to recognize this interest as a
right to be indicated in tort.
In 1928, Brandeis, then a Justice of the Supreme Court, discussed
the right to privacy in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United
States.'0 In this case, the majority opinion held that police wiretapping
5. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372 (1986).
6. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 224 (1993). See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX,
DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVER CR1MINALIZATION
8 (1982).
7. MARYA SCHECHTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 94 (1996), cited by Jeffrey
Blustein, Choosing for Others as Continuing a Life Story: The Problem of Personal
Identity Revisited, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 20 (1999).
8. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
9. Id. at 193.
10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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of telephone conversations did not constitute search and seizure under
the Fourth Amendment." Justice Brandeis' dissent argued the right to
privacy protects individuals not only from private parties, but also from
the government. He wrote, the makers of the Constitution, in order to
protect people from governmental infringements on their beliefs,
thoughts, emotions, and sensations, conferred under the Fourth
Amendment "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the rights most valued by civilized men."'
12
Since that time the right to privacy has developed beyond the Fourth
Amendment. Its scope now encompasses not only private information or
places but also private decision making essential to authoring one's life
or to one's personhood, protected under the Due Process Clause.
In the 1920s, during the period in which the Court applied its laissez
faire theory' 3 and invalidated several economic and social legislations, 14
it also struck down statutes deemed to infringe on autonomy in one's life
choices. In Meyer v. Nebraska,'5 the Court invoked the Due Process
Clause to strike down a state statute that prohibited the teaching of
foreign languages to students who had not passed the eighth grade. The
Court stated that substantive protection of the Clause denotes both
freedom from bodily restraint and such essential freedoms as engaging in
occupations, acquiring knowledge, establishing a home, child rearing,
and worshipping.' 
6
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,17 the Court struck
down a state statute requiring all students to attend public schools.
Applying Meyer, the Court held that the statute infringes on the parents'
and guardians' right to direct the upbringing and education of their
children.1
8
11. Id. at 466.
12. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Brandeis, J. dissenting)
("This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain.").
14. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating laws that set
maximum working hours); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating laws that
prohibit yellow-dog contracts); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S 525 (1923)
(invalidating minimum wage laws for women).
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
16. Id. at 399.
17. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18. Id. at 534-35. In Toxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the plurality opinion
and concurring opinions concluded that a court order giving grandparents a visitation
right over the parents' opposition was unconstitutional. The plurality of four justices
cited cases including Meyer and Pierce and held that parents have a substantive due
process right to child rearing without governmental intervention. Id. at 65-66 (plurality
opinion), and the four other justices generally agreed on this issue. Id. at 77-79 (Souter,
J., concurring in the judgment), 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), 86-87
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With the end of the Lochner era,' 9 the Court no longer relied on the
Due Process Clause as the basis for substantive protection of interests not
explicitly written in the Constitution. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,20 the
Court struck down a statute that required sterilization of a person who
committed a felony two or more times. In this case, the Court applied
the Equal Protection Clause and held that the distinction between those
who committed grand larceny, who would be sterilized, and embezzlers,
who were immunized from sterilization, violated the right to equal
protection.2' By applying an equal protection analysis the Court avoided
using the Due Process Clause to recognize a substantive right to
procreation. Still the Court called marriage and procreation a "basic
liberty," 22 and later cases described Skinner as recognizing marriage and
procreation as constitutional rights because of their importance in
forming one's life.23
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 24 the Court recognized a married
couple's constitutional right to use contraceptives. Again, the Court did
not invoke the Due Process Clause but instead explained that this right is
protected by a penumbra "formed by emanations" from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 25 The Court stated that these
penumbras create a zone of privacy which the government cannot enter,
and that the marriage relationship is in this zone.26 The Court stressed
the significance of a private place such as the marital bedroom rather
than personal choices such as whether to procreate, but the Court came to
focus more on autonomous choices in later cases. In addition to the
change in focus from place to choices, the later cases resumed the
development of substantive due process theory.
Two years later in Loving v. Virginia, 27 the Court held that
prohibitions against interracial marriage violated both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. As for the equal
protection analysis, the Court found that such a prohibition constitutes
"invidious" racial discrimination and applied strict scrutiny. 28 It
(Stevens, J., dissenting), and 95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
19. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Child. Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
20. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
21. Id. at 541.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. Id. at 482-85.
26. Id. at 485-86. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S 479, 516-22 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 536, 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
27. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
28. Id. at 7-11.
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concluded that the state showed no legitimate overriding purpose in
justifying the prohibition and therefore invalidated the statute.29 As for
the Due Process Clause, the Court's two-paragraph discussion was very
brief, but the Court suggested that this Clause also substantively protects
the right to choose whether to marry. The court stated that "the freedom
to marry or not marry" is "one of the basic civil rights of man, 3 ° and
"[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."
31
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,32 the Court invalidated a statute that made it
a crime to give contraceptives to unmarried persons because the statute
denied by distinguishing between married and unmarried people equal
protection.33 Here, the Court went beyond Griswold and articulated the
right to privacy as encompassing individual's choices which are
important to his or her personhood:
If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.
34
The following year, in Roe v. Wade,35 the Court held that the right to
privacy includes a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy and that this
right is protected by the Due Process Clause.3 6 In Roe, the Court
explained the importance of having the freedom to choose an abortion
for a woman as an author of her own life by stressing the impact of an
unwanted child to her health and her future life.37
In Carey v. Population Services International,38 the Court struck
down a state statute that prohibited the sale of nonmedical
contraceptives, the advertisement and display of contraceptives, and sales
of contraceptives to minors except by physicians. In its opinion, the
Court suggested that the outer limits of the right to privacy may not be
29. Id. at 11-12.
30. Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31. Id. at 12. In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), the Court characterized
marriage as "'the most important relation in life,' and as 'the foundation of the family and
of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress."' Id. at 384
(quoting Maryland v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888)).
32. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
33. Id. at 519.
34. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
35. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Id. at 153.
37. Id. (pointing out psychological, mental and physical harm and other negative
impacts caused by an unwanted child for a woman).
38. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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limited to the interests protected in the above cases. The Court stated
that it is clear that the right to privacy includes personal decisions
connected with marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education.39
In Bowers v. Hardwick,4 ° the Court sustained a state statute that
criminalized homosexual conduct, framing the issue as whether the
Constitution protects the right to homosexual sodomy. 4 1 The Court
decided that the right to privacy recognized in past cases did not
encompass the right to homosexual sodomy. The Court explained that
the interests protected by precedents are child rearing, education, family
relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception, and abortion.42 The
Court then considered whether homosexual sodomy merited protection
under the substantive due process doctrine, and whether it was "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition., 43 In light of the history of
prohibitions of homosexual conduct, 44 the Court concluded that
homosexual conduct did not satisfy its new standard.45
The Court's opinion in Hardwick suggested an end to privacy
jurisprudence based on substantive due process.4 6 This inference was
strengthened by Hardwick's reliance on "history and tradition" as
seemingly the only permissible standard by which to identify which
rights ought to be protected under substantive due process. It was
believed that, if applied, this standard might well fail to encompass
abortion rights.47
Later cases, however, revealed that a majority of justices have not
considered this standard to be exclusive. Liberal justices have
39. Id. at 685.
40. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
41. Id. at 190.
42. Id. at 190-91.
43. Id. at 192, 194. The Court has cited history and tradition as one of the standards
to determine whether certain interests can be considered as substantive due process
rights. These standards, first used to decide which rights in the Bill of Rights were to be
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97(1934), are now used to determine substantive rights not written in the Constitution.
After Hardwick, some Justices argued that the history and tradition standard is the only
factor to be used to recognize substantive due process rights. See Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (plurality opinion); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303
(1993); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
44. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192-94 & nn.5-6. See id. at 196-97 (Berger, C.J.,
concurring) (stressing the history that condemns homosexual conduct).
45. Id. at 194 (majority opinion).
46. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND.
L.J. 215, 216 (1987) (stating that Hardwick may well lead to substantive due process's
second death and overturning of prior privacy decisions).
47. See id. at 226-228 (arguing that the Court's history and tradition approach is not
consistent with Roe).
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considered history and tradition as merely one of the applicable
standards. 48 The centrist justices, such as Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, have recognized that history is primary standard but is not the
only factor to consider.49
Indeed, later substantive due process cases such as Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 50 continued to
emphasize the importance of autonomy in determining one's own life
and personhood. In Casey, the Court affirmed the central holding of Roe
and again found the right to abortion to be a constitutional right protected
under the Due Process Clause. The Court explained the value of the
personal decisions protected in precedents as a right to privacy, invoking
the notion of personal dignity and authoring of one's life.
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.5
In this case, the Court applied the "undue burden" test instead of strict
scrutiny to the regulation of abortion before viability, and struck down
the spousal notification requirement that obligated a married woman to
notify her spouse about her intent to get an abortion,52 while upholding
various other abortion restrictions. 3
More recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,54 the Court overruled Bowers
v. Hardwick and struck down a state statute that criminalized
homosexual conduct as applied to activities occurring between
consensual adults at home. The Court noted the importance of autonomy
in one's personal life as essential for preserving rights of the individual,
regardless of sexual orientation, 55 and recognized that a homosexual
48. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Whatever other liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause are fundamental, those liberties that are deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition are among them.") (emphasis added).
49. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) ("History and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.") (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
50. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
51. Id. at 851.
52. See id. at 887-98.
53. Id. at 879-87, 899-901 (plurality opinion).
54. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
55. Id. at 573-74. The Court also stated that such protection serves "their dignity as
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
relationship is "within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals. 56
In Cruzan v. Missouri, Department of Health,57 the only Supreme
Court case to squarely grapple with the constitutional dimension of
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, the Court held that the state
could require clear and convincing evidence before permitting the
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient. In
Cruzan, the patient was a woman who fell into a permanent vegetative
state after a car accident and was hospitalized in a state hospital. The
evidence showed that she had virtually no possibility of recovery from
this state, but that she could survive for thirty years with artificial
nutrition and hydration. 58 Her parents sought authorization to remove
her life support, but the Missouri Supreme Court refused their request.
The court required clear and convincing evidence that the patient would
want to forego artificial nutrition and hydration59 and found that such
evidence had not been offered.60 The U.S. Supreme Court held the state
court's requirement of clear and convincing evidence was constitutional.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that a competent
person has a right to refuse medical treatment. The Court based this
determination primarily upon the precedents that recognized due process
protection of bodily freedom. 61 At the same time, the Court stressed the
importance of autonomous choices at the end of life. Since the decision
to refuse life-sustaining treatment directly involves life and death, and
because the decision of how to spend the last days of one's own life is a
choice of how to conclude one's life, the choice of whether to refuse life-
sustaining treatment implicates personal autonomy in authoring one's
life. The Court in Cruzan recognized this, stating, "the choice between
life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming
finality., 62 Because of this aspect of end-of-life decision making, the
Court stressed the state's role in protecting the personal element of this
right.63 The Court implied that because of the importance of choosing
between life and death for one's personhood and for the meaning of
one's whole life, the patient's wish deserves respect.
Separate opinions in Cruzan reinforced this principle. Justice
free persons." Id. at 567.
56. Id. at 567.
57. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri, Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
58. Id. at 267-68 & n.l.
59. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,425 (Mo. 1988).
60. Id. at 424, 426.
61. See infra Part 11.B. 1.
62. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (stating that the decision
to refuse unwanted medical treatment is personal and profound).
63. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
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O'Connor wrote, "the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision
to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water., 64 Justice Stevens most clearly indicated that the personal nature
of death provides the basis for protection of the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment. "Because death is so profoundly personal,
public reflection upon it is unusual.' 6 5 Justice Stevens continued:
Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the
concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our
own mortality ... indeed are essential incidents of the unalienable
rights to life and liberty endowed us by our Creator.66 [T]he more
precise constitutional significance of death is difficult to describe; not
much may be said with confidence about death unless it is said from
faith, and that alone is reason enough to protect the freedom to
conform choices about death to individual conscience. We may also,
however, justly assume that death is not life's simple opposite, or its
necessary terminus, but rather its completion. Our ethical tradition
has long regarded an appreciation of mortality as essential to
understanding life's significance. It may, in fact, be impossible to
live for anything without being prepared to die for something.
67
Thus, the privacy cases and the Cruzan decision clearly show that the
right to refuse medical treatment, particularly life-sustaining treatment, is
justified by the value of personal autonomy in authoring one's life.
Seven years after Cruzan, in Washington v. Glucksberg 68 and
Vacco v. Quill,69 in which the Court declined to recognize a general right
to suicide or assisted suicide, including for terminal patients, the Court
again recognized the constitutional protection of refusing life-sustaining
treatment.7"
64. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 343 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105).
67. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 343-44. See also id. at 310-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble end,
steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of
extreme consequence."); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987) ("[T]he fateful
decision to withdraw life-supporting treatment is extremely personal. Accordingly, a
competent patient's right to make that decision generally will outweigh any
countervailing state interests."); State v. Pelham, 824 A.2d 1082, 1088 (N.J. 2002)
(same).
68. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
69. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
70. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 807. In this case, the five
concurring justices, and the majority opinion to a lesser extent, suggested that there could
be limited circumstances where the Constitution demands allowance for physician
assisted suicide. Justice O'Connor's opinion, supported by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
pointed out that there remains an answered question "whether suffering patients have a
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The Court distinguished refusal of life-sustaining treatment from
physician assisted suicide in the following ways. First, it identified a
difference in cause and effect; the patient who refuses life-sustaining
medical treatment dies from the underlying disease, whereas the patient
who takes prescribed lethal medication is killed by that medication.71
Second, the Court identified a difference in intent-the patient who
refuses the medical treatment may not have specific intent to die,
whereas the patient who commits suicide with a doctor's assistance
necessarily has it.72 The Court also stressed the right to refuse medical
treatment has a firmer constitutional basis than physician assisted suicide
in that the former can also be justified as bodily freedom.73
Accordingly, the Court in Glucksberg and Vacco declined to rely on
the value of autonomy in one's life story to justify the right to physician
assisted suicide. Nevertheless, the value of autonomy in one's life
choices has been a substantial basis for the Court's jurisprudence in
substantive due process and right to privacy cases. This autonomy
justifies, and the constitutional substantive due process protection and the
right to privacy include, the right to refuse medical treatment, especially
the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.
2. Commentators' Views on the Constitutional Protection of the
Right to Refuse Treatment
The idea that substantive due process and right to privacy
protections include the right to refuse medical treatment, especially life-
sustaining medical treatment, is supported by scholarly commentary.
Academic studies have articulated the nature of the right to privacy as
encompassing essential personal choices for one's life and personhood.
These studies have recognized that the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment is part of the right to privacy, i.e., an essential choice related to
constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the suffering that they may
experience in the last days of their lives." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer also suggested that if the patient is in severe pain which
cannot be removed from the legally available medications, it may be necessary to
consider whether the "right to die with dignity" is a constitutional fundamental right. Id.
at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter's concurring opinion
stated "I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim should not be recognized." Id.
at 789 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens emphasized that there is a
possibility that some application of the statute prohibiting assisted suicide when applied
to physician assisted suicide is unconstitutional, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 739 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment), and the majority agreed on this point. Id. at 735 n.24
(majority opinion).
71. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801.
72. Id. at 802.
73. Id. at 715. Bodily freedom is discussed in Part II.B infra.
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authoring one's life and to one's personhood.
In 1964, just before Griswold, Professor Edward J. Bloustein argued
that the fundamental principle common to the legal protection of privacy
under tort and non-tort laws, particularly constitutional law 74 is to give
respect for human dignity, personality, 75 and individuality. 76 Professor
Jeffery H. Reiman also argued that the right to privacy is essential to
one's personhood and existence. He stated, "the right to privacy is
fundamentally connected to personhood.",77 He argued that privacy is a
"social ritual" by which a society recognizes a person's existence and
thereby the person establishes his personhood.78
Professor David A.J. Richards extensively discussed the meaning
and underlying values of the right to privacy and argued that the right to
privacy consists of personal autonomy essential to forming and defining
one's life. Based upon this meaning of the right to privacy, he then
argued that the right to privacy includes one's decision making about
how to die.
Professor Richards begins his argument by explaining the
constitutional right to privacy in terms of inalienable human rights. This
notion is the basis of American constitutionalism: the respect for human
rights gives legitimacy to political power, 79 and the notion of human
rights is the basis for interpreting the Constitution. 80 According to
Professor Richards, the notion of human rights consists of two
components: autonomy and treating persons as equals.
In regard to autonomy, Professor Richards' argument begins by
distinguishing between higher-order and lower-order desires. The latter
are simply desires to do or not do something based on pleasure or talent,
which other non-human animals can also have. In contrast, only human
74. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 994 (1964).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 997.
77. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26,
37(1976).
78. Id. at 39 (emphasis omitted). Professor Charles Fried and Justice Stevens agree
with Professor Reiman. See Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288
(1977); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777
n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 146-47
(1978)). Professor Reiman also says, "[P]rivacy is necessary to the creation of selves out
of human beings, since a self is at least in part a human being who regards his
existence-his thoughts, his body, his actions-as his own." Reiman, supra note 77, at
39.
79. David A.J. Richards, Comparative Revolutionary Constitutionalism: A Research
Agenda for Comparative Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 5 (1993).
80. RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 32 ("[T]he idea of human rights is the necessary
hermeneutical principle that alone enables us to understand how it is that constitutional
provisions have any meaning at all.").
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beings have personhood,8' or the complex capacity for reflective self-
evaluation, 82 a capacity that allows them "self-critically to evaluate and
give order and personal integrity to one's system of ends in the form of
one's life." 83 These capacities permit persons to take ultimate
responsibility for how they live their lives.84 Treating persons as equals
is another element of human rights. 85 Richards avers that the idea of
human rights indicates that all persons' capacities for autonomy have
equal value.86 Based on this notion of human rights, which is embodied
by the right to privacy and the provisions of the Bill of Rights, Richards
suggests that the right to privacy includes autonomous basic life-plan
choices; choices which define the meaning of one's life.87
Richards argues that this right to privacy includes one's decision to
die in certain circumstances, including the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. He justifies this conclusion by pointing out that the
consideration of how to die is an essential life choice. The meaning of
life is considered important because of our inevitable death. 88 "If
personhood gives us the capacity of higher-order reflection on and
evaluation of our system of ends and how they cohere in life, the terms
of that reflection and evaluation are posed by the thought of our death...
and by the need to make sense of it." 89 Because of our self-
consciousness about our whole life including death and because death
frustrates the projects we set in the center of our lives,90 "making sense
of death appears to be an inexorable part of making sense of life." In
other words, "If death is senseless, life may be senseless too." 91 Based
upon this recognition, he argues that a person who has a right to define
the meaning of one's life should have a corollary right to define the
meaning of their death.9
2
Professor Ronald Dworkin also argues for protecting the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment as autonomy in authoring one's life.
Similar to Richards' distinction between higher-order decisions and
lower-order preferences, Professor Dworkin divides people's interests
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 8 (citing Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 7 (1971)).
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 8-10.
85. RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 9.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 50, 61, 62.
88. Id.
89. RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 247.
90. Id. at 248.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 249.
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into experiential interests and crucial interests. 93 The experiential
interests are those whose value is determined by the fact that they offer
pleasurable or exciting experiences. 94 They can also be called
"experiential preferences," 9' and include such activities as playing
softball, watching a football game, or listening to music. 96 On the other
hand, the critical interests people have are those that "make their life
genuinely better to satisfy.' '97 An example of this is someone's close
relationship with his children; this has value not just because one desires
this experience, but also because one believes a life without it would be a
much worse one.
98
Professor Dworkin argues how we die is a matter critical to the
success of our whole life. It is critical in two ways. First, how we die is
a critical question because death is part of our life and every part of our
life is important. Second, death is a peculiarly important event as it is at
the climax of one's life, and thus has important symbolic meaning.99
The first aspect suggests that control of the manner of our death is
critical to forming our lives. Both the memory a patient leaves to
surrounding people and a patient's fear of dependence involve her
dignity. 100 A patient's sense of integrity and coherence in her life is
intimately related to his decision whether to continue to live.'0 '
The second aspect underscores the importance of controlling the
manner in which we die. Dworkin states, "There is no doubt that most
people treat the manner of their deaths as of special, symbolic
importance: they want their death, if possible, to express and in that way
vividly to confirm the values they believe most important to their
lives."' 1 2 Some want to die in battle while others would prefer to die in
bed; some want to keep living, despite being in severe pain, for a crucial
event such as birth of a grandchild. Others want to avoid prolonged life
in a permanent vegetative state because such a manner of death might
express an idea they abhor: that mere biological life has independent
value. 10
3
Professor Dworkin's above argument does not directly refer to the
Constitution. But if the Due Process Clause substantively protects
93. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 201-08.
94. Id. at 201.
95. Id. at 202.
96. Id. at 201.
97. Id.
98. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 202.
99. Id. at 209.
100. Id. at 210.
101. Id.
102. id. at 211.
103. Id. at 211-12.
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various autonomous choices that are essential for authoring one's life,
Professor Dworkin's explanation of the critical importance of certain
end-of-life decision making justifies the protection of one's right to
refuse medical treatment under the Clause.
Professor Dan W. Brock justifies respect for one's refusal of life-
sustaining treatment based on the value of individual autonomy and
individual well-being. 104 His discussion also gives a basis for
constitutional protection of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment as
autonomy in authoring one's life. Professor Brock argues that the value
of self-determination is explained by its role in permitting "people to
form and live in accordance with their own conception of a good life"'
10 5
and, in exercising self-determination, to let "people take responsibility
for their lives and for the kinds of persons they become."' 0 6 People's
capacity to control their lives in this way lies at the center of human
dignity.10 7 Brock argues that the value of individual self-determination
includes end-of-life decision making; he notes that people's concern
about the nature of the last stage of their lives "reflects not just a fear of
experiencing substantial suffering when dying, but also a desire to retain
dignity and control during this last period of life."'18
The second basis of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is
individual well-being. For competent persons, the value of well-being
does not conflict with the value of self-determination, because patients'
well-being is determined by the patient herself. Brock says, "when a
competent patient decides to forgo all further life-sustaining treatment
then the patient, either explicitly or implicitly, commonly decides that the
best life possible for him or her with treatment is of sufficiently poor
quality that it is worse than no further life at all."'0 9
104. Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 10, 11
(1992). See also James F. Childress, When Is It Morally Justifiable to Discontinue
Medical Nutrition and Hydration?, in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO
FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 67, 69 (Joanne Lynn ed., Expanded ed. 1989)
("Apart from constraints set by scarcity and principles of justice in the allocation of
resource ... the fundamental moral principles for decisions about withholding or
withdrawing medical treatments that prolong life are (1) beneficence ... and (2) respect
for persons, often stated in terms of autonomy.").
105. Brock, supra note 104, at 11.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS
340 (2d ed. 1996) ("The principle of permission sustains the secular moral right of free
individuals for better or worse to choose their own ways of living and dying. In fact, the
principle of beneficence, from the general perspective of secular ethics, gains content
only in terms of such choices, for such choices fashion concrete visions of meaning and
purpose.").
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3. Alternative View on the Right to Privacy and Its Justification
of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
After Bowers v. Hardwick and Glucksberg, some commentators
provided alternatives to the idea of the right to privacy as a right to
autonomy in authoring one's life or defining one's personhood. Even
under one of these alternative views, the right to refuse treatment can be
justified.
Professor Jed Rubenfeld suggests, as an alternative to the
personhood principle that justifies the right to privacy based on its
importance in personhood or formation of one's life, the view that the
right to privacy is a "fundamental freedom not to have one's life too
totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state."' 10 Under
his approach, for example, the abortion ban would violate the right to
privacy not because of the importance of choice of abortion for one's
personhood, but rather because such a ban forces an identity as
motherhood for a long period of time 1 1 and shapes a woman's mind in a
certain way through a bodily restraint called pregnancy.1 2 The refusal of
life-sustaining medical treatment is also protected under Rubenfeld's
approach. He argues that a ban on the refusal of life-sustaining treatment
would force a patient into a rigidly standardized, almost completely
occupied life on a hospital bed and would control the patient's bodily
functions with an external agency against the patient's will. 13
Professor Louis Shepherd explains the right to privacy with what he
calls a "meaning thesis." He says, "The meaning thesis suggests that the
right of privacy should guarantee to individuals the right to make
decisions that will profoundly affect the meaning they will find in their
lives." 114 Professor Shepherd proposes replacing the so-called
"personhood thesis" that considers the right to privacy as consisting of
important determinations to one's identity and personhood with the
110. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 784 (1989). He
also rephrases that if the law makes a "totalitarian" intervention into one's life, the law
violates the right to privacy. Id. at 787. In Japan, the academics take the conventional
approach in the U.S. and consider what unenumerated right is constitutionally protected
under the Article 13. However, there is a commentator that takes similar position to
Professor Rubenfeld. Professor Ken Nemori argues that Article 13 provides for a right
not to have the government infringe one's dignity. Ken Nemori, Jinken to shite no Kojin
no Songen [Dignity of Individuals as a Constitutional Human Right], 175 HOGAKU
KYOSHITSU 52, 54 (1995).
111. See id. at 788.
112. Id.at788-89.
113. Id.at 795.
114. Lois Shepherd, Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REv.
251, 301 (2001).
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meaning thesis." 5 He criticizes the personhood thesis, claiming among
other things that it is backward-looking, writing, "Under the personhood
thesis decisions define what already is, rather than what will be;
decisions reflect who a person already is rather than form who that
person will become." 116 Then he argues that his "meaning thesis" is
superior insofar as it "suggests that the right of privacy should guarantee
to individuals the right to make decisions that will profoundly affect the
meaning they will find in their lives."
'
" 
7
Despite Professor Shepherd's assertions, this definition is
substantially the same as the personhood thesis. This is because the
personhood thesis considers that certain autonomous choices are
important not only because they are important to retain one's current
personhood but also because they affect one's future personhood.
Indeed, it has been explained that the constitutional protection of an
intimate association, for example, is important partly because "[f]or most
of us, our intimate associations are powerful influences over the
development of our personalities."'1 8 It has been explained that the
decision to have a child is important because "[t]o become a father or
mother is to assume a new status, a new identity in the eyes of oneself
and others."' 19
In addition, Professor Shepherd argues that under the meaning
thesis respect for one's decision concerning whether to continue a life is
not justified because "death is the opposite of life. . . . Death is not
meaning and it is not life." 120 Professor Shepherd's thesis fails to
recognize the salient difference between being dead as a status and
entering death as the completion of one's life. Moreover, it is obvious
that death is not meaningless to one's life. As Professor Richards
discussed, death and mortality lead a person to form one's life project;
this project, and living according to it, give meaning to life.' 21
The above cases and most academic studies support the thesis that
the refusal of medical treatment, especially life-sustaining treatment, is
protected under the Due Process Clause because such decision making is
an essential autonomous choice intimately connected with the patient's
authorship of her life. The next Section argues that refusal of medical
treatment more generally is protected under the Due Process Clause
115. See id. at 266-74, 301-03.
116. Id. at 272.
117. Id. at 301.
118. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 636
(1980).
119. Id. at 637.
120. Shepherd, supra note 114, at 310.
121. RICHARDS, supra note 6, at 249.
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because this choice is a part of bodily autonomy/freedom, which is at the
core of due process protection.
B. Bodily Freedom
As discussed in Part II.A. 1 of this article, the U.S. Supreme Court
has recognized the right to refuse medical treatment, especially life-
sustaining treatment, as an element of an individual's autonomy in
authoring his own life. The right to refuse medical treatment in a broader
context, however, is also justified by consideration of bodily freedom.
For example, several recent Court cases have recognized competent
persons' right to refuse antipsychotic medication. This Section examines
and analyzes the Court cases that articulate an interest in bodily freedom
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional
provisions. This Section then explores the right to refuse medical
treatment in the state courts, in which the right to refuse treatment is seen
as a logical corollary to the informed consent doctrine developed in
common law as a means to protect a patient's bodily integrity.
1. Supreme Court Cases on Bodily Freedom
The Court has justified the right to refuse treatment based upon the
constitutional protection of bodily integrity. In Cruzan,122 the Court
based the right to refuse medical treatment upon bodily integrity as well
as on autonomy in authoring one's life. Referring to the Supreme
Court's precedent on bodily freedom including cases that involve
involuntary vaccination, 123 involuntary blood tests, 124 involuntary
transfer of prisoners to mental institutions,125 and corporal punishment in
public school, 126 the Court recognized "[t]he principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment."' 1
27
Cruzan relied on Washington v. Harper,128 which was decided in the
same term. Harper involved a prison inmate's refusal of antipsychotic
medication. The Court upheld a prison regulation that allowed for the
forceful medication of inmates without a prior hearing, relying on Turner
v. Safley, 129 which held that in the prison setting restrictions on
122. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
123. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905).
124. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
125. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
126. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
127. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
128. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
129. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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constitutional rights are scrutinized with a reasonable relationship test.' 30
Harper, however, affirmed that there is "a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the
Due Process Clause."' 131 The Court in Harper also held that "[t]he
forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body
represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty.' 3 The
Court justified this right based on the aforementioned precedent
recognizing bodily freedom. 1
33
In Riggins v. Nevada, 134 the Court reversed the conviction of a
defendant who was involuntarily treated with an antipsychotic drug
during the trial. The Court stated that the "interest in avoiding
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs was protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.' 35 The Court stated
that only an overriding state interest will suffice to outweigh the
individual liberty implicated. 36 It held that at least when the defendant
is competent for trial without such medication, the state should prove that
"treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and,
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of the
defendant's own safety or the safety of others."' 13
7
Most recently in Sell v. United States,138 the Court articulated the
conditions that are prerequisites for the government to constitutionally
compel the administration of antipsychotic medication for the purpose of
making a detainee competent for trial. Such forced administration is
allowed when the involuntary administration will significantly further
important governmental interests, such as the interest in bringing to trial
130. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
13 1. Id. at 221-22. See also id. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Every violation of
a person's bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty. The invasion is particularly
intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of permanent injury and premature death.
Moreover, any such action is degrading if it overrides a competent person's choice to
reject a specific form of medical treatment. And when the purpose or effect of forced
drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of
liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.").
132. Id. at 229 (majority opinion).
133. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488-01 (freedom from institutionalization in a mental health
facility); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-19 (1982) (freedom from physical
restraint and basic training to avoid incurring injury in a state facility)); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979) (freedom from confinement for medical treatment).
134. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
135. Id. at 134.
136. Id. at 135. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178-79 (2003) ("In Riggins,
the Court repeated that an individual has a constitutionally protected liberty 'interest in
avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs'-an interest that only an
'essential' or 'overriding' state interest might overcome.").
137. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135.
138. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
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an accused person of a serious crime; 139 if less intrusive treatments or
means for administering the drugs are unlikely to achieve substantially
the same results; 140 and if the administration of the drugs is medically
appropriate. 141
The Supreme Court has also found that the Due Process Clause
provides substantial protections for bodily integrity outside the context of
treatment itself. In 1905, Jacobson v. Massachusetts142 the Court implied
that there is constitutional liberty in refusing the smallpox vaccine, which
must be weighed against the state interest. 43 In Meyer v. Nebraska'44 the
Court implied that the core of the due process protection is freedom from
bodily restraint. 45 In Ingraham v. Wright,146 the Court recognized that
the Due Process Clause encompasses freedom from corporal punishment
in public schools. 147 The Court held, however, that as long as the
corporal punishment "is reasonably necessary for the proper education
and discipline of the child," 148 it does not violate the Due Process
Clause. 149 In Parham v. JR.,50 children in a mental health facility
challenged a state's commitment procedure that requested a guardian's
application and a physician's diagnosis but did not require notice and a
hearing. The major issue in JR. was whether the procedure was
constitutional, but the Court recognized that children and adults have a
substantial liberty interest in freedom from confinement or bodily
restraint. 151 Vitek v. Jones152 struck down a state's procedure for the
transfer of prisoners to a state mental hospital. The Court held that the
procedure did not provide adequate notice and hearing and was therefore
violative of the Due Process Clause. In this ruling, the Court averred that
139. Id. at 180-81.
140. Id. at 181.
141. Id.
142. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
143. Id. at 24-30.
144. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
145. Id. at 399 ("Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.").
146. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
147. Id. at 674.
148. Id. at 670.
149. Id. at 676 ("[T]here can be no deprivation of substantive rights as long as
disciplinary corporal punishment is within the limits of [school officials'] common-law
privilege.").
150. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
151. Id.at600-01.
152. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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an individual has a liberty interest in freedom from unwanted
confinement and treatment in a mental hospital. 153 Youngberg v.
Romeo' 54 was decided on similar grounds. The Court recognized that
"the right to personal security constitutes a 'historic liberty interest'
protected substantively by the Due Process Clause." 155 It confirmed,
"liberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action." 156 In Foucha v. Louisiana, 57 the Court again
reiterated the principle that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always
been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action."'
5 8
In a 2003 case, Chavez v. Martinez, 59 the Court implied that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantively protects
people from torture. In this case, the plaintiff sued a police supervisor
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his coercive interrogation of the plaintiff. 60
After the plaintiff was shot by an another police officer during an
altercation, arrested and transferred to a hospital, the police supervisor
started asking him questions without giving the Miranda warnings, even
after the plaintiff's plea for treatment and clear refusal to talk until
treated. 16 The plaintiff was never charged with a crime.
162
The opinions were severely divided. This case involved two
constitutional provisions: freedom from torture under the Due Process
Clause and freedom from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
As for the Fifth Amendment issue, the plurality opinion by Justice
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, stated that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated unless the
153. Id. at 494. However, it is not clear whether this case recognized that this right is
not only a procedural right but also a substantive right. The court said this right "requires
procedural protections." Id.
154. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). This case involved a 33-year-old
man with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child who was involuntarily sent to a
state mental health facility at his mother's request, where he was subjected to physical
restraint against his mother's wishes.
155. Id. at 315 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,673 (1977)).
156. Id. at 316 (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted)). The Court went on to recognize that to the extent necessary to secure
an individual's right to personal security and freedom from bodily restraint, the person
has a right to training. Id. at 316-18.
157. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
158. Id. at 80.
159. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
160. Id. at 763-64 (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 764.
162. Id.
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government seeks to use the confession as evidence at trial.
163
As for protection under the substantive due process doctrine, Justice
Souter wrote a one-sentence Court opinion remanding the case for
examination of the substantive due process issues. 164 The five justices
who joined the one-sentence court opinion also indicated in their separate
opinions that the plaintiff has a strong case under substantive due process
theory. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, suggested that the police
conduct in this case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but was not sympathetic to the Firth Amendment claim.
65
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg opined that the
police conduct in this case would implicate both the Due Process Clause
and the Fifth Amendment. He wrote:
[U]se of torture or its equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement
violates an individual's fundamental right to liberty of the person....
The Constitution does not countenance the official imposition of
severe pain or pressure for purpose of interrogation. This is true
whether the protection is found in the Self-Incrimination Clause, the
broader guarantee of the Due Process Clause, or both. 1
66
Justice Kennedy continued that the constitutional violation is not limited
to official imposition of severe pain but "[t]he police may not prolong or
increase a suspect's suffering against the suspect's will.' ' 167 Kennedy
concluded that the record in this case showed the police conduct to be
unconstitutional. 168 On remand, the Ninth Circuit found the police
conduct to be in violation of the Due Process Clause. 6 9
163. Id. at 766-73. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads, "No
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and
thus one could interpret that this provision bars against a forced confession from a
witness in a criminal trial, not in the stage of investigations. However, as early as 1897,
in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897), the Supreme Court recognized that it
applies to criminal investigations. According to the Court, the historical background of
the Self-Incrimination Clause is the principle of nemo tenetur. Id. at 544-45 (quoting
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896)). This doctrine has its origin in protests
against the coercive interrogation of criminal suspects, including torture, id. at 545, 547-
48; Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 479 (2005),
and existed until 1688 in England. This doctrine was deeply embedded in the legal
values of American colonists and they incorporated it into the Constitution. Bram, 168
U.S. at 547-48. See also Godsey, supra, at 479-81. Under this Clause, the Court
excludes evidence gained through physical and other coercive means.
164. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 779-80 (majority opinion).
165. Id. at 779 (Souter J., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis in
original).
167. Id. at 797.
168. Id.
169. See Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542
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The Court has protected bodily freedom under other provisions too.
In an 1891 case, Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, the U.S.
Supreme Court mentioned the importance of the freedom to control one's
own body.170 In this case, the Court held that in a civil action a federal
court has no power to force Ms. Botsford to submit to a surgical
examination to determine the extent of the injuries she incurred in an
accident. The Court said, "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law."
171
In Rochin v. California, 172 which would have been a Fourth
Amendment case if it had been decided after the incorporation through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 173 the Court held that police conduct at
issue, including a struggle to open the suspect's mouth and forcibly
extracting the contents of his stomach by means of a stomach pump,
violated the Due Process Clause. 1 74 The Court noted that the police's
conduct "shock[ed] the conscience" and "offend[ed] even hardened
sensibilities." 175 In Schmerber v. California 176 the Court held that
involuntary administration of a blood test to a drunk driving suspect was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Court stated that
the Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he interests in human dignity and
privacy" as "fundamental human interests."1 77 In Winston v. Lee,
178
where the issue was whether it was reasonable to force a suspect to
submit to an involuntary surgical procedure to remove bullets from his
body for the purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence, the Court held
the procedure to be unconstitutional in view of its invasiveness and threat
to the safety of the suspect, on the one hand, 179 and the lack of a
compelling need by the state to retrieve the bullet on the other.'
80
The Court also suggested that pat down searches also involve one's
bodily freedom and integrity. In Terry v. Ohio,'81 the Court articulated
U.S. 953 (2004).
170. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,251 (1891).
171. Id.
172. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
173. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
174. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168-74.
175. Id. at 172.
176. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
177. Id. at 769-70.
178. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
179. Id. at 763-65.
180. Id. at 765-66.
181. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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the prerequisites for such a search. 182 The Court stated that a pat down
search "is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly."'18 3 The Court called the protected interest in this
case the "right to personal security."'
184
Moreover, the Court has suggested that abortion and procreation
involve not only autonomy in authoring one's life but also bodily
freedom. As discussed above,18 5 Skinner struck down the statute that
required sterilization of some criminal convicts. Although the Court
stressed the importance of procreation and marriage as important life
choices, 8 6 this case has also been construed as protecting an aspect of
bodily freedom from unwanted surgical intrusion.18 7 In Casey, the Court
not only justified the right to abortion as autonomy in authoring one's
life but also as the right to bodily freedom. The Court concluded, "it is
settled now.., that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to
interfere with a person's most basic decisions about.., bodily
integrity," 188 and emphasized the mental and physical burden
experienced in carrying a child to full term.1
8 9
The importance of bodily freedom as a necessary foundation for
other autonomous decision making is also stressed by commentators.
Professor Radhika Rao stresses that the substantive due process
protections include not only autonomy concerning personal intimate
relationships but also bodily autonomy. 190 She argues that bodily
autonomy "defines a sphere of self-control, a sphere of decision-making
authority about oneself, from which one can presumptively exclude
others."'191 She recognizes that the right to refuse life-sustaining medical
182. Id. at 27.
183. Id. at 17. See also United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing that because one's interest in body is far greater than
property, a person who gives general consent for a body search in a public place would
not mean this to include the genital area and, in the case of a woman, her breast area,
whereas an individual's consent to a drug search in his car would mean all spaces in his
car where drugs might be hidden).
184. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
185. See supra notes 20 to 23 and the accompanying text.
186. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
187. See, e.g., Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 n.42; Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
188. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (majority opinion). See also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238,250-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the right to personal appearance
involves both the right to privacy and the right to bodily freedom).
189. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (citation omitted).
190. See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U.L. REv. 359,
388-89 (2000).
191. Id. at 428 (quoting Daniel R. Ortiz, Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 92 (1989)).
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treatment is included in this autonomy. 92 Professor Tom Gerety says,
"control over the body is the first form of autonomy and the necessary
condition ... of all later forms,"' 93 and "[t]he body is the necessary
condition of both identity and autonomy."'
' 94
Professor Rubenfeld argues that the Constitution guards against
governmental intrusion into one's body. 195 He points out that
governmental control of individuals' bodies is a way for the government
to standardize and control our lives.
A person's life and identity may be shaped as forcefully through
taking control over her body-as is done, for example, in some
military or religious disciplines-as through the attempted control of
her mind. Indeed, bodily control may be the more effective medium
to the extent that thought cannot, as it were, meet such control head
on, as it might when confronted by an idea that it is told to accept.
The exertion of power over the body is in this respect comparable to
the exertion of power over a child's mind: its effect can be formative,
shaping identity at a point where intellectual resistance cannot meet
it. 9
2. State Courts' Justification of Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment as Bodily Freedom
State courts have a tendency to justify the right to refuse treatment
as bodily freedom, especially referring to the common law doctrine of
informed consent. 197 The courts explained that the right to refuse
192. Id. at 389-90.
193. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 266 (1977).
194. Id. at 266 n. 119. Professor Gerety asks, "if we don't control our bodies, what do
we control?-and indeed who are we?" Id. (emphasis in original). See also Louis
Henkin, Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 210-11 (Michael J. Meyer and W. A. Parent
eds. 1992) ("[H]uman dignity requires respect for every individual's physical and psychic
integrity, for his (her) "personhood" before the law, for her (his) autonomy and freedom;
these are not to be lightly sacrificed, even for the welfare of the majority or not for the
common goods. Sometimes human dignity is seen as requiring more-the full
development of the individual's personality, respect by society and by one's neighbors,
security for one's 'honor' and self-esteem.").
195. See Rubenfeld, supra note 110, at 788-91.
196. Id. at 788-89.
197. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269, Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 755 (Md.
1993); Barber v. Super. Ct., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015 (1983). Certainly, some courts
did not mention the U.S. Constitution. However, it is established by the above cases that
the Constitution protects competent persons' right to refuse medical treatment based on
the value of bodily integrity, security and freedom. Also as the Courts often repeat, the
substantive due process rights at least include liberties historically protected. Therefore,
some courts' avoidance of invoking the constitution cannot mean that it is not a
constitutional right or that the value of bodily freedom manifested in the common law
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treatment is a logical corollary of this doctrine and often noted that this
right is also protected under the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.' 98 Here, the state courts' explanation of the importance of
the common law right of informed consent also gives the basis of the
constitutional right to refuse treatment.
In 1905 and 1906, two state court cases, Mohr v. Williams' 99 and
Pratt v. Davis, 200 clarified that a surgical operation could not be
undertaken without a patient's consent. In Mohr, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found that operating on an ear without consent was
illegal, and suggested, citing Pratt, that the patient had a right to
autonomy over her own body. The court said that a person has "the right
to the inviolability of his person," 201 in other words, "the right to
himself, '20 2 and "this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon,
however skilful or eminent, who has been asked to examine, diagnose,
advise, and prescribe ... to violate, without permission, the bodily
integrity of his patient by a major or capital operation, placing him under
an anaesthetic for that purpose, and operating upon him without his
consent or knowledge. 2 3
doctrine does not justify the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.
198. After Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe made it clear that the constitutional right to
privacy includes personal autonomy in authoring one's life, the lower courts started to
justify the right to refuse treatment as a part of the right to privacy as well as bodily
autonomy. The first case is In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973) in which a
Pennsylvania court approved a patient's refusal of an operation in a state hospital. The
patient was discovered to have a breast discharge indicating the possible presence of
cancer. Although the patient's refusal came from her incorrect belief that her aunt had
died of the same operation, the court respected her "irrational but competent decision."
The court said, "the constitutional right of privacy [in Roe v. Wade] includes the right of a
mature competent adult to refuse to accept medical recommendations that may prolong
one's life and which, to a third person at least, appear to be in his best interests." Id. at
623. Following Yetter, the New Jersey Supreme Court in the well-known case In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) stated, "this right [to privacy] is broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances." Id. at 663. (For cases that referred only to the right to privacy, see, e.g.,
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
In the year following Quinlan, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Superintendent
of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) recognized that the
right to refuse treatment derives from both the right to privacy and the common law
doctrine of informed consent. In the case of In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985),
the New Jersey Supreme Court based the right to refuse treatment both on the common
law doctrine of informed consent and the constitutional right to privacy.
199. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
200. Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905), aff'd, 79 N.E. 561 (II1. 1906).
201. Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15 (citing Pratt, 118 I11. App. at 166).
202. Id.
203. Id. The court also said "'The patient must be the final arbiter as to whether he
shall take his chances with the operation, or take his chances of living without it. Such is
the natural right of the individual, which the law recognizes as a legal right."' Id. at 14-
15 (quoting EDGAR B. KINKEAD, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF TORTS: A PHILOSOPHIC
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A 1914 New York case, Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital,204 also involved a surgical operation undertaken without the
patient's consent.20 5 In that case, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo articulated
patients' autonomous right over their own bodies, writing, "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable
in damages., 2
06
In 1960, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized the negligence of a
physician who had not provided adequate explanation of the risk of
cobalt radiation therapy to the patient. In this case, Natanson v. Kline,20 7
the court articulated not only the informed consent principle but also the
right to refuse treatment based on bodily autonomy, describing such
autonomy as firmly rooted in the American law system. The court
stated, "Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going
self determination. It follows that each man is considered to be master of
his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the
performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment.
20 8
In sum, the Due Process Clause and other provisions of the
Constitution protect bodily freedom. This freedom is at the core of the
substantive due process doctrine, and it is a necessary basis for other
autonomous decision making. The notion of bodily freedom, together
with the personal autonomy in authoring one's life, justifies the
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.
DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING CIVIL WRONGS EX DELICTO § 375
(1903)).
204. Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
205. At this time, the Court had not used the term "informed consent." It was first
used in the Nuremberg Code which required obtaining informed consent from human
subjects for medical research. The first American court case that used this term is Salgo
v. Leland Stanford, Jr., Univ Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
206. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93 (This quote of then Judge Cardozo, later a Supreme
Court Justice, is frequently cited in cases that involve informed consent and refusal).
207. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). Two years after Natanson, a
New York court in Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)
approved a competent patient's choice of refusing blood transfusion and explained his
right to refuse life-saving treatment without mentioning religious grounds. Id. at 706.
The court based the right to refuse treatment on America's individualistic governmental
system. It said, "[I]t is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who has
the final say and ... this must necessarily be so in a system of government which gives
the greatest possible protection to the individual in furtherance of his own desires." Id.
Another New York case, Application of Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 342
N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) also recognized the patient's right by citing the above
quoted part of Schloendorff. Id. at 397-98.
208. Natanson,350P.2dat 1104.
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III. Scope of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
A. Scrutiny of Judicial Review in the Right to Refuse Treatment Cases
Courts deciding right to refuse treatment cases have not used the
deferential rational basis test. Rather, the courts have applied a careful
balancing approach and concluded, in most cases, that the patient's
interest outweighed the government's. Similarly, as seen in Part II, in
the cases concerning refusal of antipsychotic medication by incarcerated
persons, the U.S. Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny and
required the government to make a showing of important governmental
interest, that the involuntary administration of the medication
significantly furthers this interest and that the medication used is
medically appropriate and minimally intrusive.20 9 These cases involved
incarcerated persons, whose legal rights are subject to greater
governmental restriction than those of the general population and the
constitutionality of the restrictions on these people are generally
scrutinized with more lenient standards. Therefore, the Court might well
apply even higher scrutiny to the refusal of antipsychotic treatment
outside of these settings.
Generally, when examining the constitutionality of governmental
restrictions upon a right substantively protected under the Due Process
Clause, the Court applies heightened scrutiny. It is so even in those
cases where the Court did not explicitly declare the right in question to
be a fundamental right. For example, in Sell, the Court used heightened
scrutiny, without announcing that the right to refuse medical treatment is
a fundamental right or fundamental liberty interest. In Casey, the Court
applied the undue burden test for restrictions placed on abortions prior to
the viability of the fetus without announcing that abortion is a
fundamental right.210 In Lawrence, the Court required the government to
show a strong justification for a ban on homosexual sex, 211 again,
without announcing that the right to engage in a homosexual relationship
is a fundamental right.
As will be seen below, when the courts balance the right to refuse
treatment against state interests, the courts apply a heightened scrutiny
209. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-81 (requiring government to show that there are
important state interests, the involuntary medication is necessary to and substantially
furthers the interests, and the administration of the drug is medically appropriate);
Riggens, 504 U.S. at 135 (stating that the state would have satisfied the substantive due
process if it demonstrated that "that treatment with antipsychotic medication was
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of
[the criminal defendant's] own safety or the safety of others.").
210. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874-901.
211. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575-78.
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standard. The courts recognize that the state interest in protecting life is
not merely legitimate but is an important state interest.212 It might not be
difficult to find some reasonable relationship between the state interest in
protecting life and the ban on the refusal of life-sustaining treatment.
Still, the courts have not allowed the state to prohibit refusal of treatment
due to imposing a heightened form of review.
A comparison with the physician assisted suicide cases is
illustrative. In Glucksberg and Vacco, the Court distinguished refusal of
life-sustaining treatment from physician-assisted suicide, and declined to
give constitutional protection to the latter.213 In Glucksberg, unlike the
cases of refusal of treatment, the Court used a deferential, rational basis
approach. The Court in Glucksberg was satisfied with finding that these
state interests were "legitimate" and that there were mere "reasonable
relationships" with the governmental ban on physician assisted
suicide.2t 4
B. Countervailing State Interests in Cases Addressing the Right to
Refuse Treatment
In the right to refuse treatment cases, the courts have recognized
four governmental interests against which the right to refuse treatment
should be balanced: preservation of life, prevention of suicide,
protection of innocent third parties, and the ethical integrity of the
medical profession. After this balancing, courts in most cases have ruled
in favor of the individual.
1. State Interest in the Preservation of Life
Of those governmental interests, the interest in the preservation of
life is considered most significant.215 In the cases involving a competent
212. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282 (despite recognizing "an unqualified interest
in the preservation of human life," the Court went into a detailed analysis of the Missouri
statute); Conroy, 286 A.2d at 1123-24 (despite recognition that the state interest in
preserving life is "certainly strong," the court held that it does not outweigh the patient's
right); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1990) (despite finding the state
interest in preservation of life is "fundamental and compelling" the court honored the
competent person's refusal of life-sustaining treatment).
213. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-28; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 799.
214. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-35, 728 n.21 ("Our inquiry, however, is limited to
the question whether the State's prohibition is rationally related to legitimate state
interests.").
215. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425; PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL,
MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 32 (1983). The Supreme Court
called it an "unqualified interest." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
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patient, the courts have held that the patient's interest outweighs this
governmental interest, even when the patient is not in a terminal
condition.2 16 In Lane v. Candura,2 17 a Massachusetts appellate court
authorized a 77-year-old woman's refusal of the amputation of a
gangrenous leg, despite the refusal leading to the woman's death. 2 18 In
light of her constitutional right to refuse treatment 2 19 and considering her
22
competency,20 the court ruled, "[t]he law protects her right to make her
own decision to accept or reject treatment, whether that decision is wise
,,221
or unwise.
In Bartling v. Superior Court, 222 a California appellate court
concluded that the right to refuse treatment is not limited to terminally ill
patients.2 23 In the following year, another appellate court in Bouvia v.
Superior Court224 ordered a hospital to respect a 28-year-old woman's
wish to refuse life-sustaining nutrition and hydration. The court
followed Bartling and stated that the exercise of the right to refuse
medical treatment is not limited to terminal patients.225
In the case In re Conroy, 226 the New Jersey Supreme Court,
examining previous state cases that honored a non-terminal and
competent Jehovah's Witness' refusal of a blood transfusion,2 27 reasoned
that a competent patient's right to refuse treatment is not affected by her
medical condition or prognosis.228 In McKay v. Bergstedt,2 29 the Nevada
Supreme Court, citing Bouvia, confirmed the right of a competent non-
terminal quadriplegic patient to remove her respirator. In Thor v.
On the other hand, a lower court held that the governmental interest in executing the
death penalty outweighs a right to refuse antipsychotic medical treatment for a death row
inmate whose execution date was set. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025 (8th Cir.
2003). Singleton upheld involuntary administration of an antipsychotic drug to the death
row inmate so that he could be competent to be executed.
216. See infra Part III.C.3 (Japanese criminal law scholars tend to limit the exercise of
the right to refuse treatment to terminal patients or those whose death is imminent).
217. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
218. Id. at 1235.
219. See id. at 1233.
220. See id. at 1233-36.
221. Id. at 1236.
222. Bartling v. Super. Ct., 163 Cal. App. 3d 186 (1984).
223. Id. at 193.
224. Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1985).
225. Id. at 1139-40.
226. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
227. See id. at 1225-26. The court mentioned John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971), overruled by Conroy; Application of President and
Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. George,
239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
228. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1226.
229. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
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Superior Court,230 the California Supreme Court declined to authorize
the involuntary use of a gastronomy tube to feed and medicate a
competent quadriplegic inmate. Affirming the lower court cases Bartling
and Bouvia, the court suggested that a patient's refusal removes a
physician's right and duty to treat regardless of the patient's life-
expectancy and the kinds of medical procedures needed for treatment.23'
In addition, some courts found that the state interest in preserving
life means protecting the life that the patients themselves believe is worth
protecting. Under this view, the essence of- the state interest in the
preservation of life lies in respect for personal autonomy. In
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, the court
recognized that "the sanctity of individual free choice and self-
determination [are] fundamental constituents of life. ' 232 In Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 233 in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Court supported withdrawal of a gastronomy tube,2 34 the court
more clearly articulated this view: "The duty of the State to preserve life
must encompass a recognition of an individual's right to avoid
circumstances in which the individual himself would feel that efforts to
sustain life demean or degrade his humanity.,
235
The court in Conroy demonstrated the view that the patient's life
should be protected consistent with her autonomy. The court recognized
two aspects of the state's interest in preserving life: an interest in
preserving the life of a particular patient and an interest in preserving the
sanctity of all life.236 As for the first interest, Conroy argued that
patients' autonomy should generally prevail over this interest "because
the life that the state is seeking to protect in such a situation is the life of
the same person who has competently decided to forego the medical
intervention; it is not some other actual or potential life that cannot
adequately protect itself., 237 The latter interest, the court said, is so
230. Thor v. Super. Ct., 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
231. Seeid.at381-82.
232. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(Mass. 1977).
233. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
234. In Brophy, the court did not order the private hospital to remove the gastronomy
tube, but rather authorized the incompetent patient's wife to move him to a suitable place.
See id. at 639-40.
235. Id. at 635. See also Thor, 855 P.2d at 383 (quoting and affirming this
statement); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The possibility of a
medical miracle is indeed part of the calculus, but it is a part of the patient's calculus.")
(emphasis in original).
236. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223. See also Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 640; Thor, 855 P.2d
at 383; Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419; In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 320 (I11. 1989).
237. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223.
[Vol. 25:1
2006] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT 37
"indirect and abstract ' 238 that it is generally superseded by "the patient's
much stronger personal interest in directing the course of his own life.,
239
Insofar as several courts have found that the "life" in the state interest in
preserving life is the patient's autonomous life, this interest cannot
logically stand against the patient's personal autonomy in medical
treatment.
While the state interest in preserving life generally cannot outweigh
competent persons' right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, it
does not mean the government cannot take other measures for protecting
this interest which are less restrictive of the right to refuse treatment, so
long as they are not an undue burden240 on the patient's decision to refuse
treatment.
The government can and arguably should, as a matter of public
policy, provide an environment where more competent persons would
choose to undergo life-sustaining treatment and live longer. The
physical pain or burden of treatment can, in most cases, be minimized by
proper medication. 24' Furthermore, the government can and should take
measures to remove mental burdens faced by sick or disabled persons.
Disability rights advocates point out that there is a tendency for persons
with disabilities to be viewed by others and by themselves as burdens on
society and their families and also note that there is societal pressure on
these people to choose to die.242 A good public policy should be that the
government removes such a sense of burden and the pressure.243
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Michael P. Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold of Life and Death: A
Suggested Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L.
REv. 971, 995-1008 (2004).
241. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT:
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 40 (2d ed. 2000).
242. Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with
Disabilities-Is It a Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 56 (1993); Paul K.
Longmore, Elizabeth Bouvia, Assisted Suicide and Social Prejudice, 3 ISSUES L. & MED.
141, 168 (1987) ("Given the lumping together of people with disabilities with those who
are terminally ill, the blurring of voluntary assisted suicide and forced 'mercy' killing,
and the oppressive condition of social devaluation and isolation, blocked opportunities,
economic deprivation, and enforced social powerlessness, talk of their 'rational' or
'voluntary' suicide is simply Orwellian newspeak. The advocates of assisted suicide
assume a nonexistent autonomy. They offer an illusory self-determination."); id. at 159
("[R]ather than upholding [disabled people's] right to live productively and
meaningfully, this society chooses to engineer [their] death."); SHINYA TATEIWA,
YOWAKU ARU JiYu E [FREEDOM TO BE WEAK] 52-55 (2000) (arguing that general self-
determinations of people with incurable diseases or severe disabilities has not been easily
respected whereas their self-determination to die has, because the fulfilling of the former
self-determination is inconvenient for surrounding people and society whereas the latter
releases the family and society from the burden of caring for these people.).
243. SHINYA TATEIWA, ALS: FUDO NO SHINTAI TO IKISURU KIKAI [ALS: AN
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Moreover, as a matter of public policy, the government can and should
not only provide financial support for life-sustaining treatment and
physical and mental care for the sick or disabled persons, but should also
assist them achieve more autonomous, independent life, so that, for
example, the persons like Ms. Bouvia can be employed and/or live
independently at home. 2"
Another factor to be considered is that a competent person who
refuses life-sustaining medical treatment may be suffering from
depression or other mental disorders.245 When her depression or mental
disorder does not render her incompetent,246 she can still retain as strong
a right to refuse treatment as other competent persons. However, when a
competent patient is refusing life-sustaining treatment, as Professors
Brock and Lynn note, the refusal may well be her "dramatic, last-resort
IMMOVABLE BODY AND A BREATHING MACHINE] 142-49 (2004) (arguing that when the
physicians notify infliction of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) to the patients,
physicians should not talk value-neutrally but encourage them to live with respirator
when it becomes necessary to survive); at 373-75 (arguing that we should encourage the
ALS patients to live with respirator and persuade the patient that it is a wrong idea that a
life where you cannot do things by yourself to survive is not worth living.).
244. See Stanley S. Herr, et al., No Place to Go: Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment
by Competent Persons with Physical Disabilities, 8 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 24-26 (1992).
Professor Longmore writes about Ms. Elizabeth Bouvia's struggles to be independent.
She was a competent woman suffering since birth from cerebral palsy and arthritis, and
she was also quadriplegic. At the time of the case she was 28 years old, and was totally
dependent on others for all of her needs. Id. at 1136. A tube had been attached to her
chest for reducing chronic physical pain with a periodic dose of morphine. Id. The
hospital inserted a nasogastric tube against her will. Id. It was found that she could live
another 10-15 years with sufficient feeding. Professor Longmore stresses that her current
condition and wish to die are caused by the prejudice and discrimination against her. At
the time of litigation, Ms. Bouvia was bed-ridden, depressed, with a feeding tube
inserted, and wishing to die. However, he says, "[t]his is a woman who operated a power
wheelchair and was on her way to a master's degree and a career in social work. This is a
woman who married, made love with her husband and planned to become a mother. This
is a woman who aimed at something more significant than mere physical self-sufficiency.
She struggled to attain self-determination, but she was repeatedly thwarted in her efforts
by discriminatory actions on the part of her government, her teachers, her employers, her
parents, and her society. ... [Wlhat makes life with a major physical disability
ignominious, embarrassing, humiliating, and dehumanizing is not for extensive physical
assistance, but the dehumanizing social contempt toward those who require such aid."
Longmore, supra note 242, at 158.
245. See Dan W. Brock & Joanne Lynn, The Competent Patient Who Decides Not to
Take Nutrition and Hydration, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 201, 207 (Joanne Lynn ed., Expanded ed. 1989)
("nearly every person who chooses to die is afflicted with a mental illness."); NEW YORK
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 24 1, at 13-16.
246. See, e.g., Jobes, 529 A.2d at 454 n.4 ("If a patient refusing medical treatment is
depressed, should that asserted choice be disregarded ...?") and Harper, 494 U.S. at 219-
36 (discussing the limitation of competent inmate's right to refuse antipsychotic
treatment).
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plea to others for help. 247 In such cases, the government can encourage,
or require an attending physician to encourage the refusing patient, if
medically appropriate, to undergo psychiatric treatment and to notify
various support systems in the community, as long as such measures do
not inflict an undue burden upon the patient's exercise of the right to
refuse treatment. A government which both cherishes personal
autonomy and life can and should take such measures without restricting
the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.
2. State Interest in Preventing Suicide
Today assisted suicide is often considered a crime while suicide
itself is generally not. The argument for constitutional protection of
suicide in general has neither been accepted in courts 248 nor widely
accepted by scholars. Thus, generally, a government can constitutionally
intervene in attempted suicide. 249 However, the courts have
distinguished refusal of life-sustaining treatment from attempted
suicide.2 5
0
At common law, suicide is "an individual ... purposefully set[ting]
in motion a death-producing agent with the specific intent of effecting
his own destruction or, at least, serious injury."' 251  There are two
components of suicide: (i) specific intent to die and (ii) purposeful
setting in motion of the death-producing agent.25 2  Some activity is
considered attempted suicide only when both components are satisfied.
The courts have found that a patient's refusal of life-sustaining
treatment does not meet the definition of suicide. As for the second
component, refusal of life-sustaining treatment can be distinguished from
247. Brock & Lynn, supra note 245, at 207; Herr, supra note 244, at 20-21.
248. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711-16, 723-29 (1997).
249. But see id. at 735 n.24. The Court suggested some possibilities where even
suicide is constitutionally protected in exceptional circumstances.
250. Before Quinlan, a judge in the D.C. Circuit suggested, as one of the reasons for
the authorization of a compelled blood transfusion, that a patient's refusal of a lifesaving
blood transfusion is a form of suicide. Georgetown Coll., 331 F.2d at 1006-10. The
patient was a 25-year-old Jehovah's Witness and the mother of a seven-month old child,
and the patient's life was in danger because of a ruptured ulcer. Overriding her and her
husband's refusal, the judge authorized a blood transfusion, stating, "where attempted
suicide is illegal by the common law or by statute, a person may not be allowed to refuse
necessary medical assistance when death is likely to ensue without it." Id. at 1008-09.
The courts since Quinlan have disagreed with this view.
251. Robert M. Bym, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 16 (1975).
252. Id. at 18; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11. See also Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 625
(citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1968) ("[T]he act or an
instance of taking one's own life voluntarily and intentionally; the deliberate and
intentional destruction of his own life by a person of years of discretion and of sound
mind; one that commits or attempts self-murder.")).
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attempted suicide because it merely allows the disease or injury to take
its natural course. 3 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this distinction in
Vacco v. Quill.254 Lower courts have focused on the second component
(purposeful setting in motion of a death-producing agent), because
regardless of whether the first component (patient's specific intent to die)
is met, refusal of treatment does not satisfy the second component.
For example, in Saikewicz, the court said, "even if the patient did
[have the specific intent to die], to the extent that the cause of death was
from natural causes the patient did not set the death producing agent in
motion with the intent of causing his own death.' ,255 In the case In re
Fiori,256 a 1996 case that authorized the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from a permanently vegetative patient, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded, by referring to just the second component,
that the state interest in prevention of suicide was not involved.257 In
contrast to the right to refuse treatment cases, hunger strikes are more
likely to meet the second component: whether the individual's refusal
becomes suicide depends on the first component. In a case of a
prisoner's hunger strike,258 an appellate court in Florida found that the
hunger strike meets the second component but not the first. The court
held that the hunger strike in this case was for protest purpose and not for
terminating life itself,25 9 and thus the hunger strike was not attempted
suicide. When another court found the hunger strike in issue was for the
purpose of termination of life, it concluded such conduct is an attempt to
253. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11; Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223-
24; In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. 1996).
254. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801-02 ("[W]hen a patient refuses life-sustaining medical
treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests
lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.").
255. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n. 11. See also Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162,
(authorized removal of a respirator from a competent 73-year-old patient with
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, explaining that disconnecting the respirator would result in
death from natural causes).
256. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996).
257. Id. at 910. In McKay v. Bergstedt, the Nevada Supreme Court discussed at
length the patient's intent after it found there was no purposeful setting in motion of a
death-producing agent. The court tried to limit the kind of cases in which the court could
recognize that a patient did not have specific suicidal intent, explaining, "[t]o a large
extent, a patient's attitude or motive may be judged from such factors as severity of
physical condition, diagnosis, prognosis, and quality of life." Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 627.
Under such an approach, a curable patient is more likely to be considered as having a
specific suicidal intent. However, if a patient's refusal of life-sustaining treatment does
not satisfy the second component, purposeful setting in motion of a death-producing
agent, a court's finding of possible suicidal intent itself is not enough to see such a refusal
to be attempted suicide.
258. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1106-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
259. Id. at 1109.
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commit suicide.26°
In Cruzan, Justice Scalia suggested that the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment is generally equivalent to attempted suicide but this
view is unsustainable. His concurrent opinion in Cruzan stated,
[I]t would not make much sense to say that one may not kill oneself
by walking into the sea, but may sit on the beach until submerged by
the incoming tide; or that one may not intentionally lock oneself into
a cold storage locker, but may refrain from coming indoors when the
temperature drops below freezing.
261 
'
The flaw in Justice Scalia's reasoning is that he fails to recognize the
difference between situations where the person purposefully puts himself
or herself in danger and where the person is unintentionally or forcefully
put in danger. If a person is involuntarily taken into the sea or locked
into a freezer, and ceases attempts at self-rescue, their conduct is not
described as suicide. Likewise, a patient who is refusing life-sustaining
treatment is not attempting suicide, unless the patient intentionally
contracts a disease or suffers an injury in order to die.262
In sum, when the courts have considered the state interest in
preventing suicide, they have found that the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment does not constitute an attempt to commit suicide. The courts
have found that a patient's refusal of treatment does not satisfy the
second component, because the refusal of treatment is merely allowing
the disease or injury to take its natural course.
3. State Interest in the Protection of Innocent Third Parties
Courts have recognized this interest when the patient has a minor
child or is pregnant. Unlike other state interests, this state interest
supersedes the patient's right to refuse treatment in some limited
situations.
a. When the patient has a minor child
In Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc., 263 a federal circuit judge referred to the female patient's seven-
month-old child as a basis for permitting the hospital to give a blood
transfusion against the wishes of the patient and her husband. After this
260. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96-97 (N.H. 1984).
261. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring).
262. Thus, the government can constitutionally provide emergency medical treatment
to survivors of attempted suicide against their wishes.
263. Application of President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
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case, however, the courts addressing the issue have generally come to
agree that unless the patient's refusal and the resulting death leaves no
one who is capable of caring for the child, the patient's refusal outweighs
the state interest. In the case of In re Osborne,264 the D.C. Court of
Appeals honored the patient's refusal of a blood transfusion, partly
because it was revealed that the children's other family members would
care for the children and supply their material needs. 265 In In re
Farrell,266 the New Jersey Supreme Court authorized the removal of a
respirator from a patient suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
even though she had two teenage sons. The court said that the patient's
right prevailed over the state interest in protecting third parties. This was
because her husband had the capability to care for the children and they
had already suffered from stress caused by her illness; consequently, the
decision to withdraw treatment would not cause any more stress to
them.2
67
In Fosmile v. Nicoleau, 268 the New York Court of Appeals
suggested that the state's interest in protecting a child's welfare generally
cannot override a patient's right to refuse treatment. In Nicoleau, the
patient's refusal was based on her religious beliefs, but the court based
its decision on the general right to refuse treatment. 269 The court pointed
out that the patient's right to choose to undergo or forego treatment is not
conditioned on the patient being without minor children. 270 The court
also referred to the fact that states had not interfered with every personal
decision that could jeopardize the family unit or the parental
relationship,271 such as the adoption and divorce laws that sometimes
elevate the rights of parents above those of children,272 or the criminal
punishments administered even when it causes problems for the
criminal's family.273 Also, the court pointed out that there is no law
prohibiting parents from engaging in dangerous activities because of the
possible risk of leaving children as orphans.274
264. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
265. Id. at 374.
266. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987).
267. Id. at413.
268. Fosmile v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
269. Id. at 80 ("The question as to whether this order violates the patient's
constitutional rights to religious freedom or to determine the course of her own medical
treatment raises important and sensitive issues. However, they need not be resolved here
because in our view the patient had a personal common-law and statutory right to decline
the transfusions.").
270. Id. at 83 (citing Schloendorffv Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914)).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 84.
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Other courts did not go as far as New York, but stressed the high
possibility that the child's other parent and other persons may protect the
children. The Massachusetts Supreme Court supported the refusal of a
lifesaving blood transfusion by the mother of a five-year-old child.275
The court held that the patient's right outweighed the state's interest in
protecting third parties. It required, but did not find, compelling
evidence that the child would be abandoned.276 It noted that the husband
had financial resources and the husband's sister and brother-in-law could
help the husband take care of the child.277 In the case In re Dubreuil,
278
the Florida Supreme Court supported a patient's refusal of a lifesaving
blood transfusion. The patient had two children and a husband from
whom she was separated. The court required the state to show with clear
and convincing evidence that her death would cause her children to be
abandoned despite the presence of the husband and other persons
including family members279 and found that sufficient evidence was not
presented.280
Accordingly, courts have generally ruled that a state's interest in
protecting a minor child supersedes the patient's rights when the
patient's child will be abandoned after the patient's death. However, the
courts have generally honored the patient's wish to refuse treatment
unless it is clearly shown that the patient's child will likely not be
supported by the child's other parent or family members.
b. When the patient is pregnant with a viable fetus
The state interest seems strongest in exceptional cases in which the
patient is pregnant with a viable fetus and the patient is refusing the
treatment offered to protect the fetus. Some courts have found a
compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus. In In re Brown,281 an
appellate court in Illinois supported a pregnant woman's refusal of a
blood transfusion based on her religious belief. Her pregnancy had
advanced to 34 and 3/7 weeks and her fetus was viable; under Roe v.
Wade282 the state had a compelling interest in the fetus' potential life.
283
Nevertheless, the Illinois court distinguished this refusal-of-treatment
275. Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991).
276. Id. at 1024-25.
277. Id.
278. In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
279. Id. at 827-28.
280. Id.
281. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (I11. App. Ct. 1997).
282. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
283. See id. at 163.
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case from abortion or abuse cases 284 and concluded that the woman's
right to refuse treatment outweighed the state's interest.
285
However, in Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical
Center,286 a federal district court in Florida found that the state interest in
preserving the life of a fetus outweighs a pregnant woman's right to
refuse a Caesarian section. In Pemberton, a pregnant woman who had
undergone more than one day of labor at home refused a Caesarean
section when she came to the hospital emergency room for intravenous
hydration. Though a physician advised her to undergo a Caesarean
section, she refused and went home.287 A state attorney obtained an
order from a federal circuit judge that she return to the hospital and that a
Caesarean section be performed.288 The district court upheld the order by
arguing that Roe's finding of the state's compelling interest in a fetus's
life after viability applies to a case involving a woman's right to refuse
Caesarean section and thus the state interest outweighs the woman's
right.2
89
Despite Pemberton, it is not clear whether Roe should be applied to
cases involving a Caesarean section. Although this article does not reach
a conclusion with respect to this question, it would appear that abortion
cases and refusal-of-treatment cases are distinguishable by introducing,
by analogy, the distinction between attempted suicide and the refusal of
lifesaving treatment. A pregnant woman who medically needs a
Caesarean section and refuses it may not have a specific intent of
destroying the fetus; and the death of the fetus would not be caused by
purposeful conduct, but by the natural course of the woman's medical
condition.29° Moreover, with abortion cases generally silent on the issue
of fetal rights as against Caesarian sections, it appears that a state's
interest in preserving the life of the fetus has not historically been
284. Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 405.
285. See also In re Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (I11. App. Ct. 1994). Another appellate
court of Illinois also said, "[A] woman's right to refuse invasive medical treatment,
derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is not
diminished during pregnancy. The woman retains the same right to refuse invasive
treatment, even of lifesaving or other beneficial nature, that she can exercise when she is
not pregnant. The potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant." Id. (citing
Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (I11. 1988)).
286. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251-54
(N.D. Fla. 1999).
287. Id. at 1249.
288. Id. at 1249-50.
289. Id. at 1251-52 & n.9.
290. Cf Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a state
hospital's performance of a diagnostic test, without consent of the patient, to obtain
evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and that the interest in using the threat of criminal
sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure).
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extended to non-abortion cases.291
4. State Interest in the Maintenance of the Ethical Integrity of the
Medical Profession
Courts which have addressed a state's interest in the ethical integrity
of the medical profession in the context of a patient's right to refuse
treatment have generally upheld the patient's right as against the state's
interest because withdrawal of treatment based on the patient's autonomy
is widely accepted as sound medical practice.292 The New Jersey court in
Conroy, for example, citing Francis Bacon 293 as well as recent surveys,
explains that "medical ethics do not require medical intervention in
disease at all costs" and that
even if doctors were exhorted to attempt to cure or sustain their
patients under all circumstances, the moral and professional
imperative, at least in cases of patients who were clearly competent,
presumably would not require doctors to go beyond advising the
patient of the risks of foregoing treatment and urging the patient to
accept the medical intervention.4
94
Some of the cases cite the views of medical bodies in the state, which
support respect for the patient's refusal of medical treatment.295
C. Distinctions between Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatment,
Medical Treatment and Nutrition and Hydration.
The right to refuse medical treatment encompasses the refusal of all
treatments, including artificial nutrition and hydration. Proponents for
the distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" treatment argue
that certain kinds of medical treatment are "ordinary" and thus cannot be
refused, while other treatments are "extraordinary" and thus can be
refused. Along with this distinction, it is argued that a patient's right to
refuse medical treatment does not extend to artificial nutrition and
hydration. It is stressed, as a distinct feature of nutrition and hydration,
291. Cf Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of
Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1951, 1989-94 (1986) (arguing that even
under Roe, a women's health is superior to a fetus's and thus states could not force a
Cesarean section which risks women's health).
292. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27; Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 163-64;
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1224-25; Bergstedt, 106 Nev. at 825; Costello, 665 So. 2d at 1109-10.
293. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224-25 (citing FRANcIs BACON, NEW ATLANTIS, quoted in
Marya Mannes, Euthanasia vs. the Right to Life, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 68, 69 (1975)).
294. Id. at 1223-25.
295. See, e.g., In re Farrel, A.2d 404, 411-12 (N.J. 1987); In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905,
910 (Pa. 1996).
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that feeding the needy and helpless has "symbolic importance, as a sign
of the interdependency of human life in any viable community."
2 96
This distinction should not be applied at least in case of competent
patients for the following reasons. First, contrary to this view, the courts
have explained that competent persons have a right to refuse any
treatment.297 Second, the proponents for distinctions between ordinary
and extraordinary, or between nutrition and hydration and other kinds of
treatment, seem to be assuming only the situations where the patient is
incompetent. Professor Daniel Callahan, arguing against allowing the
refusal of nutrition and hydration, says that part of the reason that the
issue of cessation of artificial nutrition and hydration is a matter not only
of private morality but also of public policy is that welfare of
incompetent patients is at stake. 298 Also, those who argue for the
symbolic role of food and water are discussing care for people who want
and accept it or who cannot express their preference with regard to the
nutrition and hydration, not the competent person who explicitly refuses
them.299
IV. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
into Japanese Law
This Part attempts to apply our observation of American theories
regarding the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment to Japanese
296. Daniel Callahan, Public Policy and the Cessation of Nutrition, in BY No
EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 61,
61 (Joanne Lynn ed., Expanded ed. 1989). See also Patrick G. Derr, Nutrition and
Hydration as Elective Therapy: Brophy and Jobes from an Ethical and Historical
Perspective, 2 ISSUES L. & MED. 25, 33-34, 35 (1986).
297. In Bouvia, the court stated that the competent person can refuse any treatment,
including artificial nutrition and hydration, and denied the distinction between artificial
nutrition and other treatment for the purpose of the right to refuse medical treatment.
Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127. Accord, Thor, 855 P.2d at 378-79 (holding the
competent inmate has a right to refuse any treatment including artificial nutrition and
hydration); Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1236 (stating that competent persons have a right to
refuse any treatment). See also In re Delio, 129 A.D.2d 1, 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. 1987);
Barber v. Super. Ct., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017; In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296
(Ill. 1989); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. App. 1986); In re Grant,
747 P.2d 445, 452-54 (Wash. 1987); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 954-55 (Me. 1987); In
re Fiori, 543 Pa. at 910; In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 66-67 (Wis. 1992).
298. Callahan, supra note 296, at 62.
299. See, e.g., Derr, supra note 296, at 36 (while criticizing foregoing food and water
to incompetent patients, agreeing that competent persons can choose treatment based on
their assessment of the benefit and burden of the treatment and recognizing that tube
feeding can be a burden for competent patients). Also Ronald A. Carson, The Symbolic
Significance of Giving to Eat and Drink, in BY No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE
TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER 84, 85 (Joanne Lynn ed., Expanded ed.
1989) stresses a symbolic meaning of offering food and water to allay hunger and thirst
of dying person; not discussing obliging or forcing food and water.
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law. This Part argues that the theories applied in the United States, at
least with respect to competent patients, are applicable to Japanese law,
that the Japanese Constitution protects the right to refuse treatment, and
that consequently the governmental restriction of this right should be
reviewed with heightened scrutiny as it is in the United States. This Part
critiques current interpretations of Japanese criminal law that are not
consistent with this constitutional right.
As will be explained in this Part, Japanese courts and criminal law
scholars tend to avoid mentioning the Constitution. Even when they
mention a patient's right to refuse treatment (or more broadly, the right
to self-determination), they do not consider the right to be of
constitutional dimensions, or, even if they mention the Constitution, they
do not go into a detailed consideration about what the Constitution
requires with regard to this right. It seems that the "right" is treated as if
it were a moral right that does not control or regulate statutory
interpretation, application or enactment of laws. In addition to the
inadequate analysis of the meaning and strength of the right to refuse
treatment, the commentators have allowed this right to be outweighed by
the governmental interest in life. However, such interpretations of
criminal law contradict the Constitution.
However, most of the scholars who do not mention the
constitutional protection of this right are not denying that it merits
constitutional protection.30 0 Thus, the detailed analysis of the meaning
and limitation of the constitutional protection contained in this article
could further the development of the scholarly dialogue with regard to
the governmental prohibition of the physician's acceptance of a patient's
refusal of treatment.
This Part will first consider constitutional provisions and theories
that cover unenumerated rights under the Japanese Constitution. As
shown in Part II, in the United States the right to refuse medical
treatment is a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and is rooted in principles of autonomy in
authoring one's life and bodily freedom. In Japan, the Pursuit of
Happiness Clause, in the second section of Article 13, has a role similar
to substantive due process. This Clause has been considered to provide a
textual basis for certain rights that are not enumerated in the
Constitution. The right to refuse medical treatment can be protected
under this provision and perhaps also under the other articles that protect
freedom from bodily restraint.
300. There is an argument by an eminent commentator that denies the constitutional
protection of the patient's right to self-determination, including the right to refuse
treatment. As seen below, this argument in untenable. See Part IV.A.4.
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This Part then considers the levels of scrutiny that should be applied
to the right to refuse treatment in Japan. Under Japanese constitutional
law theories regarding the standards for judicial review, which have been
based on America's case law, governmental interference with the right to
refuse medical treatment should require heightened scrutiny, as it does in
American courts. Based upon this discussion on the textual basis and
strength of the constitutional right to refuse treatment, this Part then
critically analyzes the Japanese criminal law theories.
A. Protection of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the
Japanese Constitution
1. Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution
Chapter Three of the Constitution of Japan of 1946 provides for a
series of civil liberties.3 °1 It includes equality (Art. 14), the right to
suffrage (15), the right to petition (16), freedom from involuntary
servitude (18), freedom of thought and conscience (19), freedom of
religion (20), freedom of assembly, association, and expression (21),
freedom to travel and change and choose occupation (22), academic
freedom (23), marriage (24), social rights (25), education (26), labor
rights (28), property, (29), and other rights involving criminal procedure
and punishment (31-40). Although this listing of the civil liberties in the
Japanese Constitution is relatively extensive compared with the U.S.
Constitution, it still does not cover all significant rights and freedoms.
Article 13 of the Constitution, which is followed by articles for
specific individual rights, provides that:
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does
not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in
legislation and in other governmental affairs.
302
301. Those are called "kihonteki jinken [fundamental human rights]." This term
"calls to mind the American idea of civil liberties with a natural law flavor." Yasuhiro
Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various Influence: Japanese, American,
and European, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & Kazuyuki
Takahashi eds., 1997). There should be no difference between "fundamental human
rights" and "human rights," because the former, which came from the Potsdam
Declaration of 1945, simply means that all human rights are fundamental. NOBUYOSHI
ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II: JINKEN SORON [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW THEORY II: GENERAL
THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS] 46 (1994) [hereinafter KENPOGAKU II].
302. The "right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in Article 13 apparently
derives from the Declaration of Independence of the United States, see THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, and John Locke's idea on "lives, liberties and
estates." JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 66 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
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Unlike the specific rights and freedoms enumerated in the Constitution,
the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (hereinafter, "the
right to the pursuit of happiness") 30 3 is obviously not specific. It is
therefore no surprise that the meaning of this right has been debated
since the Constitution of Japan of 1946 was enacted.
Contrary to the majority view today, Article 13 used to be
considered simply as a provision with "programmatic" or ethical
meaning, which does not give any specific rights to people but only
urges the government to protect and respect the various enumerated
rights in the articles following Article 13. Professor Tatsukichi Minobe,
a leading scholar of the pre- and post-war era, wrote in his treatise of the
Constitution of 1946, "[Article 13] is not a provision concerning concrete
specific rights, but it rather manifests that respect for each individual's
personhood/person (jinkaku), which should be a foundation of all rights
and freedoms, shall be fundamental of the government.
30 4
In 1958, however, some Justices of the Japanese Supreme Court
recognized that the right to the pursuit of happiness can provide the basis
for unenumerated rights. Chief Justice Tanaka and Justice Shimoiizaka
wrote,
Those human rights and freedoms listed in the Constitution are done
so simply because they are historically recognized and significant,
but the list is not exhaustive. Hence, it is impossible to say that there
are no other rights or freedoms or that they are not protected. ....
They merely have no name. They consist as part of a general liberty
or the right to the pursuit of happiness.
30 5
In the 1960s, the Japanese courts and constitutional law scholars came to
recognize Article 13 as the basis of certain unwritten rights. A district
court case in 1964, the "After the Banquet" case,30 6 was the first case to
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1689).
303. Generally in Japanese discussions, the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness is called "the right to the pursuit of happiness."
304. TATSUKICHI MINOBE, NIHONKOKU KENPO GENRON [FUNDAMENTAL THEORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 167 (1948).
305. Hoashi v. Japan (Passport Denial case), 12-13 MINSHU 1969, 162 HANREI JIHO 6,
7 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Sep. 10, 1958) (Tanaka, C.J. and Shiomiizaka, J., concurring); Cf
Japan v. Aonuma (Gambling Hall case), 4-11 KEISHU 2380, 2383 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov.
22, 1950) (Kuriyama, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting a possibility that there
are some unenumerated constitutional rights to be found by the courts). This article
partly uses the translations of the Japanese Supreme Court cases in COURT AND
CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60 (John M. Maki
ed., 1964); CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS,
1961-70 (Hiroshi Itoh & Lawrence Beer eds., 1978); CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF
JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1971-1990 (Lawrence Beer & Hiroshi Itoh
eds., 1996). Translations are in part modified in order to keep consistency in the text.
306. Arita v. Hirano ("Utage no Ato [After the Banquet]" case), 385 HANREI JIHO 12
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use Article 13 as the basis for an unenumerated right. In this case, the
novelist Yukio Mishima published a novel 30 7 modeled on a famous
politician who failed in an election for the governor of Tokyo and who
divorced his wife after the defeat. The novelist vividly depicted, with
imagination, the politician and his wife's relationship, including their
sexual life, leading readers to feel that they were entering into the
politician's private life. The court found there is a right to privacy under
tort law,30 8 and ordered that compensation be paid to the politician.
Although this was a civil tort case, the court referred to the Constitution
as the basis of the right, noting,
The thought of the dignity of individuals, which is a fundamental idea
of modem law and on which the Constitution is based, can be
concrete only after personhood is mutually respected and one's self is
protected from unjust invasion. Therefore... divulging other
person's private affairs must not be allowed without a just reason.309
In the Kyoto Gakuren case,31 ° the Supreme Court of Japan for the first
time recognized that Article 13 can be a basis of unenumerated
individual rights and recognized the right not to be photographed without
consent under Article 13. In this case, a student struck a police officer
taking photographs of allegedly illegal demonstrations, including the
images of the student. The student asserted that his activity should be
justified because the officer's action unconstitutionally invaded the
student's right to freedom from unwanted photography as an aspect of
the right to privacy protected under Article 13. The court found the
officer's activity was not unconstitutional and upheld the conviction, but
at the same time acknowledged that "[Article 13] provides that the
people's freedom with respect to their private lives should be protected
against the exercise of state powers such as the police. As one freedom
of individuals with respect to private life, all people have the freedom to
not have their own face or physical appearance.., photographed
involuntarily and without permission.'3 1
Along with the cases that recognized some unenumerated rights,3
12
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Sep. 28, 1964).
307. YUKIO MISHIMA, AFTER THE BANQUET (Donald Keene trans., 1963).
308. See "After the Banquet," 385 HANREI JIHo at 27-29.
309. Id. at 28.
310. Hasegawa v. Japan (Kyoto Gakuren case/Right-to-Likeness case), 23-12 KEISHU
1625, 577 HANREI JIHO 18 (Sup. Ct, Dec. 24, 1969).
311. Kyoto Gakuren, 577 HANREI JiHo at 19.
312. See also Japan v. Nakaya (Serviceman Enshrinement case), 42-5 Minshu 277,
1277 HANREI JIHo 34, 46 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 1, 1988) (Ito, J., dissenting) ("I am of the
opinion that in modem society the interest of not being disturbed in one's mind by
unwanted stimuli from others, that is, the interest of peace of mind, can be a legal interest
under tort law. When this interest is acknowledged with respect to religion, we might
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constitutional law scholars came to agree that Article 13 provides a basis
for various individual rights. The view of the majority of today's
constitutional scholars regarding the interpretation of Article 13 is based
on Professor Harumi Taneya's view. Professor Taneya argued that the
right to the pursuit of happiness consists of various rights or interests that
are essential for an individual to exist as a being that has personhood.
According to Professor Taneya, the first part of Article 13, which
reads "All of the people shall be respected as individuals," (hereinafter,
the Respect for Individual Clause) 313 manifests the fundamental
constitutional principle that the government should respect each
individual's personhood, dignity, and equal, independent value as a
person.3 14 Therefore, the next sentence of Article 13, "Their [all of the
people's] right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the
extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme
consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs," (the
Pursuit of Happiness Clause) can be viewed as protecting various
interests that are essential for an individual to exist as a being with
personhood (personhood interests).
315
The right to the pursuit of happiness conceptually includes both
enumerated and unenumerated rights.3 16 The relationship between the
right to the pursuit of happiness and enumerated rights is the same as the
relationship between a general rule and special rules, and the principle of
specialia generalibus derogant (special things derogate from general
ones) applies. 317 Therefore, when a personhood interest is not covered
by an enumerated right, Article 13 is invoked.
Professor Koji Sato, one of the leading constitutional law scholars
in Japan today, has developed Professor Taneya's idea of the right to the
pursuit of the happiness as a comprehensive fundamental right. He
call it the personhood right of religion or of religious privacy; the terminology can be
worked out. Arguably, it might be based on Article 13 of the Constitution.").
313. Professor Taneya calls the clause "Individual's Dignity Clause" because the
Clause has the same meaning as Article 1, Section 1 of the German Constitution, which
provides for the respect to human dignity. See GG., art. 1, § 1 ("The dignity of man is
inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority.").
314. Harumi Taneya, Seimei, Jiyu oyobi Kofukutsuikyuken [Right to Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness] in KENPO II: JINKEN (1) [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II: HUMAN
RIGHTS (1)] 130, 133 (Nobuyoshi Ashibe ed., 1978).
315. Id.
316. However, Professor Taneya argues that the social rights are not included in
Article 13 but rather in Article 25 which provides general rules of social rights. See
KENPO [JAPAN CONST.], art. 25 ("All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum
standard of wholesome and cultured living. In all spheres of life, the State shall use its
endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public
health.").
317. Taneya, supra note 314, at 137-38.
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emphasizes the notion of personal autonomy more than personhood.
Professor Sato argues that the right to the pursuit of happiness in Article
13 protects the rights that are essential for a person to exist as a being
318that has personal autonomy. He also explains that the rights under
Article 13 are "the rights concerning one's personhood. ' 319
Following Professor Taneya's view, Sato argues that the Respect for
Individual Clause of Article 13 prescribes that "each human being must
be respected to the maximum extent as a holder of 'personhood.' '
320
Combined with this Clause, he argues, the Pursuit of Happiness Clause
provides a comprehensive right to personal autonomy that is essential for
an individual to exist as a being that has personal autonomy.321 Citing
authorities including Professors Joseph Raz, Professor Sato argues that
the right to autonomy under Article 13 guarantees a person to be an
author of her own life without being subject to other persons' intent.322
Conceptually the Pursuit of Happiness Clause includes both enumerated
and unenumerated rights. But, again, this Clause functions as a general
rule and the principle of specialia generalibus derogant applies here.
Thus Article 13 can be invoked for those autonomous choices that are
not covered by other enumerated provisions of constitutional rights.323
2. Recognition of the Constitutional Right to Refuse Treatment
in Japan as Autonomy in Authoring One's Life
Professor Sato further categorizes the unenumerated rights protected
318. Koji SATO, KENPO [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 445 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter
KENPo]. Professor Sato defines autonomy as meaning that a person is the author of her
own life, without being subjected to other persons' intentions. Koji Sato, Kenpogaku ni
oite "Jikoketteiken" o Iukoto no Imi [Meaning of Discussing "the Right to Self-
Determination" in Constitutional Law Study], 1989 HOTETSUGAKU NENPO76, 86.
[hereinafter Meaning]. He explains that the reason why autonomy is stressed these days
is that since the end of the 19th century, in order to realize a welfare nation, the
governments have intervened more and more into people's private lives, and thus the
individual's autonomy is now in danger. Koji Sato, Nihonkoku Kenpo to "Jikoketteiken "
[The Japanese Constitution and "the Right to Self-Determination"], 98 HOGAKU
KYOSHITsu 6, 9-10 (1988) [hereinafter Self-Determination] (citing David A. J. Richards,
Rights and Autonomy, 92 ETHICS 3, 4 (1981); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
407 (1986); ROBERT B. YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY 1 (1986)). Therefore, people's
personal autonomy should be the basis of all constitutional rights. Sato, Self-
Determination, supra, at 10.
319. SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 447.
320. Id. at 444. Therefore, Professor Sato's argument can consist with Professor
Taneya's.
321. Id.at445-48.
322. Sato, Meaning, supra note 318, at 86 (citing RAz, supra note 5, at 204, 398)).
See also SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 448 (stating that the Right to Pursuit of
Happines is a general declaration of constitutional protections of rights and freedoms that
are essential for an individual to be the author of her own life).
323. SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 448.
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under the Pursuit of Happiness Clause into (1) bodily freedom outside of
criminal settings and the right to life,324 (2) rights involving the value of
personhood itself (e.g., rights involving reputation, informational
privacy, and environment),325 (3) the right to self-determination,326 and
(4) procedural due process outside of criminal settings.327 Professor Sato
states that the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is covered by the
Pursuit of Happiness Clause, because an individual is the author of her
life and because death is one of the stages of life.328 According to
Professor Sato, the first category (bodily freedom) and third category
(the right to self-determination) implicate the right to refuse medical
treatment. 329 Scholars of constitutional law have recognized
constitutional protections of the right to refuse treatment on both
grounds, but with more emphasis on the right to self-determination than
on a right to bodily integrity.
The scholars have commented that generally the right to refuse
medical treatment is part of the constitutional right to self-determination.
Even though there has been little further discussion of the detailed
meaning and applications of this constitutional right, these general
comments demonstrate the importance these scholars attribute to
constitutional protection of the right to refuse treatment. For example,
Professor Hiroyuki Takai, who examined American case law through the
1980s concerning patients' constitutional right to self-determination,
concluded that under the Japanese Constitution it is possible to recognize
competent persons' right to refuse life-sustaining treatment in some
situations. 330 Professor Ashibe recognizes that the right to refuse
treatment implicates Article 13. 3 Professor Hitoshi Serizawa
recognizes that when a decision whether to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment is made by an adult or a minor with decision making
324. Id. at 450.
325. Id. at 450-58.
326. Id. at 459-62.
327. Id. at 462-44 (procedural due process in criminal settings are enumerated in
Article 31).
328. Sato, Meaning, supra note 318, at 89.
329. SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 450, 460.
330. Hiroyuki Takai, Iryo ni okeru Jikoketteiken no Kenporonteki Ichikosatsu (2) [A
Review of the Rights to Self-determination in Medicine from the Constitutional Point of
View (2)], 123-24 HOGAKU RONSO 97, 121 (1988); Hiroyuki Takai, Seimei no Jikokettei
to Jiyu [Self-determinations and Liberties Concerning Life], 978 JuRISUTO 106, 106, 108-
09 (1991) (arguing that it is possible to justify the refusal of life-sustaining treatment as
personal autonomy protected under Article 13). In the first of these articles, Professor
Takai suggests that competent person's refusal of life-sustaining treatment is allowed
only when the treatment is highly invasive to the body. However, he does not give
further explanation on this suggested limitation.
331. AsHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 400.
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capacities, that decision should be respected332 under the Constitution.333
Professor Yasuo Hasebe says that Japanese Supreme Court's recent
Jehovah's Witness Blood Transfusion case 334 involves the constitutional
right to self-determination, which consists of various choices that
"trump" governmental intervention.
335
Moreover, several scholars specializing in criminal law recognize,
at least at an abstract level, that the right to refuse treatment is
encompassed within the constitutional right to self-determination.
Professor Tatsuhiko Tateyama recognizes that refusal of life-sustaining
treatment implicates the right to self-determination protected under
Article 13. 336 Professor Hisao Kato points out that involuntary
hospitalization of people with mental disease implicates Articles 13, 18,
and the provisions involving criminal procedure.337 Professor Katsunori
Kai writes that the right to refuse treatment is the very manifestation of
the principle of respecting individuals and their right to the pursuit of
happiness provided under Article 13.3 38 Professor Minoru Oya also
recognizes that refusal of life-sustaining treatment implicates Article
3. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment as a Bodily Freedom
Under the Japanese Constitution, it is also possible to consider the
332. Hitoshi Serizawa, Kodomo no Jikoketteiken to Hogo [Children 's Right to Self-
Determination and Children 's Protection], in JIKOKETrEIKEN TO Ho [RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION AND LAW], 147, 164 (Takashi Ebashi et al. eds, 1998).
333. Id. at 160.
334. Takeda v. Japan (Jehovah's Witness Blood Transfusion case), 54-2 MINSHU 528,
1710 HANREI JIHO 97 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 29, 2000). This case is discussed in infra Part
IV.C. 1.
335. YASUO HASEBE, KENPO [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 167 (2d ed. 2001). Professor
Hasebe explains that the Constitution protects certain autonomous choices as trumps. Id.
at 120-21 ("For many, life's meaning is given only by designing, choosing and living
their own lives. At least for certain matters, the right to make autonomous choices should
be given to individuals as a [constitutional] human right.... In other words, the meaning
of "trump" should be given to [constitutional] human rights so that they override the
governmental power regarding public welfare.") (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)).
336. TATSUHIKO TATEYAMA, JIKOKETrEIKEN TO SHINU KENRI [RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION AND DEATH RIGHTS] 15 (Revised ed. 2002).
337. Hisao Kato, Seishin Shogai Hanzaisha no Jinken Hogo ni tsuite [Protection of
Human Rights of Criminal Offenders with Mental Disabilities], in SEISHIN SHOGAISHA NO
KYOSEI CHIRYO [INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES] 78,
87-90 (Akira Nishiyama ed., 1994).
338. KATSUNORi KAI, SONGENSHI TO KEIHO [DEATH WITH DIGNITY AND CRIMINAL
LAW] 91 (2004).
339. See MINORU OYA, INOCHI NO HORITSUGAKU: SEIMEI NO TANJO KARA SHI MADE
[LEGAL STUDY OF LIFE: FROM BEGINNING TO END OF LIFE], 24-28, 156-57 (2d ed. 1994).
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right to refuse medical treatment to be a right protected under the articles
regarding the freedom from bodily restraint. At a minimum, these
provisions explain the value of bodily freedom and reinforce the
protection of the right to refuse treatment as an unenumerated right under
Article 13.340
Article 18 guarantees freedom from slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Japanese Constitution also contains detailed provisions
that protect individuals in criminal settings. Article 31 provides for due
process in criminal procedures and Article 33 requires a warrant for
apprehension. Article 34 offers freedom from unreasonable detention
while Article 35 protects freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
Article 36 absolutely forbids torture and cruel punishments.
Even assuming these provisions do not directly protect bodily
freedom outside of criminal procedure, the importance and value of
one's bodily freedom provided in and recognized by these articles
strengthen its protection under Article 13. As discussed above, Article
13 has a supplemental role of protecting important rights not covered by
other provisions, 34' and thus it can be a basis of bodily freedom outside
of criminal settings if the other specific provisions are not. Professor
Sato's first category of unenumerated rights includes this freedom.342
The right to refuse medical treatment in terms of a bodily freedom
has received even less attention in Japan than has the same right
described in terms of personal autonomy in authoring one's life.
However, there are still a few commentators who have discussed the
constitutional protection of the right to refuse treatment based upon
bodily freedom. Professor Sato has commented that the first category of
unenumerated right (the right to bodily freedom outside of criminal
settings and the right to life) includes refusals of medical treatment and
the doctrine of informed consent.34 3 Professor Isao Takenaka argues that
involuntary psychiatric treatment violates not only the right to self-
determination protected under Article 13 but also bodily freedom
protected by Articles 13 and 18 . Professor Masakazu Doi argues for
340. Indeed, the commentators have long called these provisions and the provisions of
criminal defendants in the Constitution to be the provisions of "bodily freedom (jinshin
no jiyu / shintai no jiyu)." See, e.g., SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 585 (categorizing
Articles 18, 31-39 as provisions of "protection of bodily freedom and procedural
protection in criminal procedure"); Yasuo Sugihara, Jinshin no Jiyu [Bodily Freedom], in
KENPO III: JINKEN (2) [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW III: HUMAN RIGHTS (2)] 85 (Nobuyoshi
Ashibe ed. 1981) ("Bodily Freedom"); Hasebe, supra note 335, at 252 (same).
341. See supra notes 317, 323 and the accompanying text.
342. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
343. SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 460.
344. Isao Takenaka, Jinken to shite no "Jikoketteiken ": Sei to Shi o meguru Kenpo
Mondai ["Right to Self-Determination" as a Human Right: Constitutional Issues over
Life and Death], 884 JURISUTO 180, 185 (1987).
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recognition of the right to refuse treatment as a right to bodily integrity
under the Japanese Constitution.
345
4. A View that Denies a Constitutional Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment
Accordingly, the right to refuse treatment can and should be
protected under Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution and the
constitutional scholars in an abstract level have come to agree. However,
one noted scholar argues against constitutional protection of patients'
self-determination, including refusal of treatment.
The scholar argues that one primary reason to deny constitutional
protection of the right to refuse treatment is that it could lead to a
situation in which the theories of constitutional law might govern
informed consent principles between private physicians and patients;
thus it would prevent development of informed consent theory under
civil law. 346 Moreover, it is argued that there is no necessity for
constitutional protection of patients' self-determinations.347
I disagree. To recognize an interest as a constitutional right is a
separate issue from having the Constitution regulate every detail of
matters regarding patients' choices of treatment.
The Japanese Constitution generally does not govern relationships
between private parties. Certainly, the Japanese Supreme Court has
implied a possibility that protection of constitutional rights includes, in
limited circumstances, protection from infringement by private parties.
In the Mitsubishi Plastics case,348 a plaintiff employee was fired because
of his political activities while in college; he then sued for reinstatement
and damages. The Court denied the general claim that the Japanese
Constitution's provisions of equality and a freedom of conscience applies
to the relationships between private parties, 349 but the Court stated that
when there is an excessive infringement of a person's interests by
another private person, a person's fundamental liberties and equality
could be protected through civil law provisions. 350 In the Nissan Motors
case, 351 the Court held that contracts that provide different mandatory
345. Masakazu Doi, "Seimei ni taisuru Kenri " to "Jikokettei" no Kannen [Notions of
"Right to Life" and "Self-Determination "], 58 KOHO KENKYU 92, 98-99 (1996).
346. Norio Higuchi, Kanja no Jikoketteiken [Patients' Right to Self-Determination],
in JIKOKETTEIKEN TO Ho [RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND LAW], 63, 73 (Takashi
Ebashi et al. eds., 1998).
347. Id. at 70, 73-75.
348. Mitsubishi Plastics, Inc. v. Takano (Mitsubishi Plastics case), 27-11 MNSHU
1536, 724 HANREI JIHO 18 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 12, 1973).
349. Id., 724 HANREI JIHO at 20-21.
350. Id.at21.
351. Nissan Motors, Inc. v. Nakamoto (Nissan Motors case), 35-2 MINSHU 300, 998
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retirement age for men and women are void under Article 90 of the Civil
Code,3 52 which nullifies contracts and transactions that violate a public
order/policy (kojo ryozoku). 3 Thus it is possible to see that the
constitutional provision, or its background idea, has some role in the
interpretation of Article 90. Some constitutional law scholars explain
that these cases indirectly applied constitutional law into private
relationships via Article 90 of the Civil Code.354 However, it is also
possible to describe this phenomenon by saying that the courts are
merely applying the Civil Code by referring to the values embodied in
the Constitution.355 At any rate, however, it is obvious that such
constitutional involvement in the activities of private parties is, if any, a
collateral effect of the constitutional protection of certain rights.356
Indeed, there seems to be no phenomenon in Japan in which the courts'
application of constitutional provisions to private relationships has
hindered sound development of civil law.
Moreover, denial of the necessity of a constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment in Japan underestimates the likelihood of
governmental intrusion into self-determination by patients. There are
circumstances in which the right to refuse medical treatment cannot be
explained in terms of civil law right alone. First, the government might
prosecute physicians who accept a patient's refusal of life-sustaining
treatment. Thus far, there has been no case in which a physician has
been prosecuted for accepting a patient's refusal. However, as discussed
below, 357 there is an active debate among criminal law scholars regarding
a patient's decision to forego life-sustaining treatment, which
demonstrates a possibility that physicians may be subject to prosecution
in the future. When the government tries to prosecute a physician who
accepted a patient's refusal of life-sustaining treatment, the patient's
constitutional right becomes an integral defense.
Second, denials of the necessity of a constitutional right to refuse
HANREI JIHO 3 (Sup. Ct., March 24, 1981).
352. Id., 998 HANREI JIHO at 4.
353. MINPO [CIVIL CODE], art. 90.
354. See, e.g., MIYOKO TSUJIMuRA, KENPO [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 175-79 (2d ed.
2004); YOICHI HIGUCHI, KOKUHOGAKU: JINKEN GENRON [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
GENERAL THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS] 130 (2004); ToSHIHIKO NONAKA ET AL.,
KENPO I [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I] 234-35 (3d ed. 2001).
355. See SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 437-38 (explaining that even a position for
direct application of the Constitution to private parties does not deny that it applies
through private law's provisions).
356. There are constitutional provisions designed to apply private parties. The
slavery in private parties, for example, is prohibited by the Constitution. See, e.g., KENPO
[JAPAN CONST.] art. 18 (prohibition of involuntary servitude); art 27, para. 3 (prohibition
of child exploitation); art. 28 (workers' rights to organize and do collective bargaining).
357. See infra Part IV.C.3-4.
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treatment also overlook the various circumstances in which patients must
directly confront the government which seeks to force treatment upon
them. Governmental intervention into patients' self-determination is not
limited to the government's indirect regulation of patients' rights by
regulating physicians' acts through criminal law.
For example, until 1992, the government had involuntarily
confined, segregated and treated people suffering from Hansen's disease.
In a 2001 case, 358 a district court held that the confinement and
segregation infringed not only the patient's right to travel under Article
22359 but also the patient's personhood rights protected under Article 13
of the Constitution, because the governmental segregation substantially
impaired any meaningful opportunities to develop their lives as human
beings. 360 The court stated that segregation is allowed only when there
are no other less restrictive means to avoid contagion 361 and it found that
as early as 1960 medical technology abrogated the need for
segregation.362 Although the court did not directly use the word self-
determination or autonomy, it found that the government infringed the
patients' personhood rights in that it had deprived them of personal
autonomy in authoring one's life.
The government has also involuntarily confined and treated persons
with infectious disease or mental illness. A Japanese statute allows the
government to involuntarily hospitalize persons with infectious
363diseases. Another statute authorizes involuntary hospitalization of
persons with mental illnesses who are likely to hurt themselves or harm
others,364 and to keep the patients hospitalized until the government finds
358. Hansen's Disease case, 1748 HANREI JIHO 30 (Kumamoto Dist. Ct., May 11,
2001).
359. KENPo [JAPAN CONST.] art. 22, para. 1 ("Every person shall have freedom to
choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does
not interfere with the public welfare.").
360. Id. at 99 ("The segregation of the patients of Hansen's disease generally is
prolonged for a long period of time. But only a few years of segregation have
devastating effects on their life. Some are forced to give up studying, lose his or her job
or lose a chance for a dreamed job. Others are forced to lose a chance to marry, have a
family and raise children, or are severely restricted to have an intimate life with family
members. The opportunities to develop one's life in every respect, which every person
should have as a human being, are destroyed. These restrictions on constitutional human
rights reach all aspects of social life. The reality of these restrictions [constitutes] the
infringement of the right to personhood protected under Article 13.").
361. Id.at99-100.
362. Id. at 100.
363. Kansensho no yobo oyobi kansensho no kanja ni taisuru iryo ni kansuru horitsu
[Law of Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Treatment of the Patients with
Infectious Disease], Law No. 114 of 1998, art. 20.
364. Seishin hoken oyobi seishin shogaisha fukushi ni kansuru horitsu [Law of
Mental Health and Welfare of Persons with a Mental Disease], Law No. 123 of 1950,
arts. 29, 29-2.
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that there is no such likelihood of harm, based on the opinion of the
hospital.365
Here, it is not naive to recognize the constitutional right to refuse
treatment and to consider the constitutionality of these statutes. As for
involuntary hospitalization of people with mental illnesses, Professor
Kato suggests "protecting, as a legal right, the patient's simple thought
that 'it is unbearable to be confined and deprived of freedom of activities
just because he happens to suffer from mental illness.', 366 He implies
that under the Japanese Constitution involuntary hospitalization is
allowed only when the person with mental illness has engaged in
criminal activity or violated others' legal interests and when a judge or
prosecutor finds that the undesirable behavior would likely be repeated if
the patient was not hospitalized.367
If one pursues the development of civil law doctrines beyond
control of the Constitution, one should argue that private physicians'
conduct should not be controlled by the Constitution rather than deny the
constitutional right itself. To deny the existence of a constitutional right
because of a fear that recognition of the right would have undesirable
statutory consequences, as the above scholar's argument seems to do, is
not an appropriate method of constitutional exegesis; the meaning of the
constitution does not depend on statutes. The Constitution generally
does not control civil law interpretation, nor can civil law interpretation
as such control the interpretation of the Constitution. Moreover, a
categorical denial of certain constitutional rights could be so broad that it
might deprive an individual of an effective defense from governmental
power.368
B. Standards of Judicial Review and the "Double Standard" Theory
The constitutional law scholars' discussions on the right to refuse
treatment have gone little further than the general recognition that the
Japanese Constitution protects the right to refuse medical treatment, and
the scope of this right has little yet been discussed.36 9 In contrast, there
365. Id. art. 29-4.
366. Kato, supra note 337, at 89.
367. Id. at 87-88, 97-98.
368. The commentator also argues that a reason why the right to refuse medical
treatment is recognized as a constitutional right in the U.S. but should not in Japan is that
in the U.S. it had to be argued in order to gain federal jurisdiction. Higuchi, supra note
346, at 69. However, this explanation does not stand here. Most of the American courts
that recognized the constitutional right to refuse treatment are the state courts which do
not have to find a federal question for their jurisdiction. The fact that the state courts
nevertheless mentioned the Constitution suggests that they realized the obvious
importance of the right to refuse medical treatment as a constitutional right.
369. Professor Sato writes that the refusal of life-sustaining treatment is favored at
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have been active discussions over the scopes of the constitutional
protections of spiritual rights (seishinteki jiyuken), including freedom of
conscience, 370 freedom of expression, 371 religion, 372 and academic
study.373 Japanese constitutional scholars have argued for, and the courts
have partially adopted, the "double standard" theory, stating that
heightened scrutiny applies to spiritual freedoms, while only a deferential
standard applies to economic freedoms. This difference in the level of
constitutional scrutiny has been explained that the spiritual freedom is
necessary to secure the democratic process while economic freedom is
not and that the spiritual freedom has more important substantive value
than economic rights. If the value of spiritual rights can explain courts'
application of heightened scrutiny to the governmental restrictions of
spiritual rights, the right to refuse treatment should also be protected
from governmental intrusions with heightened scrutiny, because of this
right's crucial value as autonomy in authoring one's life and bodily
freedom.
1. Double Standard Theory between Spiritual Freedom and
Economic Freedom
The Japanese Constitution explicitly provides for the court's power
of judicial review. Article 81 states, "The Supreme Court is the court of
last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law,
order, regulation, or official act., 374 The lower courts have this power as
well.375
Referring to U.S. cases and theories, Japanese constitutional
scholars have developed theories concerning the standards for judicial
review.3 7 6 Today, it is established among scholars that spiritual freedoms
least when the patient is unrecoverable and suffering from pain, but he is not limiting the
right to these patients. See SATO, KENPO, supra note 318, at 460; Sato, Self-
Determination, supra note 318, at 19. Professor Ashibe comments that a terminal
patient's refusal of treatment is honored, ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 400,
but he did not discuss a non-terminal patient's refusal of life-sustaining treatment other
than commenting that it should be considered in the future. Id. at 401. The constitutional
scholars' discussions do not seem to have gone further.
370. See KENPO [JAPAN CONST.], art. 19 ("Freedom of thought and conscience shall
not be violated.").
371. See id. art. 21 ("Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press
and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.").
372. See id. art. 20 ("Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all.... (2) No person shall
be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice . .
373. See id. art. 23 ("Academic freedom is guaranteed.").
374. KENPO [JAPAN CONST.], art. 81.
375. See Japan v. Yanagi (Food Control Act case), 4-2 KEISHU 73, 75-76 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Feb. 1, 1950).
376. See generally Hidenori Tomatsu, Judicial Review in Japan: An Overview of
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require more heightened scrutiny than economic freedoms.
377
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court of Japan has to some extent
accepted this two-tier approach. 378 Though the Court has never used
strict scrutiny to strike a statute restricting free speech or other spiritual
freedoms, the Court has suggested in dicta as a general principle that
there are two different standards of judicial review for spiritual freedom
and economic freedom.
The two-tier approach was first announced in the Supreme Court by
Justice Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in a 1969 obscenity case.379 The
Grand Bench (en banc) of the Supreme Court, 380 in an 1 1-to-4 vote,
affirmed the conviction of the publisher who sold a translation of the
Marquis de Sade's In Praise of Vice. Criticizing the Court's view that
freedom of expression is equally subject to the demand of public welfare
as is economic freedom, Justice Tanaka expressed the view that free
expression goes beyond public welfare and is only subject to its own
internal limitation. He wrote that freedom of "speech, the press and all
other forms of expression.., and academic freedom.., constitute the
very basis of democracy and.., thus extremely significant; such
constitutional freedom should be given.., substantial protection. ....
This freedom... is different from freedom to choose occupation and to
choose and change residence."
381
Justice Tanaka's distinction between spiritual and economic
freedom was accepted by the majority in 1972 and 1975. In the 1972
case,382 which upheld as constitutional a statute that required a certain
distance between market complexes for small retail businesses, the en
banc Court stated, "As for an individual person's freedom of economic
Efforts to Introduce U.S. Theories, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPANESE
SOCIETY, 251, 260 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001) (indicating Japanese constitutional
scholars' efforts to produce constitutional value arguments based on American theories to
help litigators argue for protecting constitutional rights).
377. See id. art. 22 ("Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his
residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the
public welfare.") and art. 29 ("The right to own or to hold property is inviolable,
(2) Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare,
(3) Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefore.").
378. For a brief summary of Japanese Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding free
speech and standards of judicial review, see HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 106-15 (2d ed.
1999).
379. Ishii v. Japan, ("Akutoku no Sakae [In Praise of Vice]" case), 23-10 KEISHU
1239, 569 HANREI JIHO 3 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 15, 1969).
380. The Japan Supreme Court has 15 justices and they are separated into three five-
justice petty benches. The Grand Bench (en banc) is opened when there is a new
constitutional issue or a new precedent is forthcoming.
381. "In Praise of Vice," 569 HANREI JIHO at 13 (Tanaka, J, dissenting).
382. Marushin Industries, Inc. v. Japan (Osaka Small Business Restraint case), 26-9
KEISHU 586, 687 HANREI JIHO 23, 25 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 22, 1972).
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activity, different from an individual's spiritual freedom and the other
freedoms, the Constitution anticipates, and also allows, certain
reasonable measures that restrict the freedom of economic activities of
individual citizens as a means of implementing social economic
policies." 383 In the 1975 case, 384 the Court struck down as
unconstitutional under Article 22 the minimum distance requirement
between drug stores. In spite of its conclusion that the particular
economic regulation was unconstitutional, the Court referred to the two-
tier approach between economic and spiritual liberties: "the demand for
regulation by public authority on freedom to choose an occupation is
stronger than on other constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, especially
on the spiritual freedom." 385  More recently, in 1989, the Court's
unanimous opinion noticed in dicta, "the strict standard [is] generally
required when the freedom of expression is restricted.,
386
The two-tier approach in Japan has its origin in the U.S. Supreme
Court case, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 387 which was
decided just after the Supreme Court stopped judicial intrusion into
economic legislation in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.388 In Carolene
Products Co., Justice Stone, writing for the Court, recognized the
constitutionality of legislation that prohibited the shipment in interstate
commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than
milk fat. He held that the legislation enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality and it would be found constitutional as long as it was
supported by a rational basis.389
In Footnote 4,390 however, Justice Stone outlined three categories of
law to which the presumption of constitutionality is not given and
heightened scrutiny is applied: legislation (1) which is "within specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments," (2) "which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation"
and (3) which is inimical to "discrete and insular minorities. 39'
Professor Ashibe explains that Footnote 4 expresses the idea that
since spiritual freedom is essential to a democratic political process, the
383. Id., 687 HANREIJIHO at 25.
384. Sumiyoshi, Inc. v. Governor, Hiroshima (Hiroshima Pharmacy Location case),
29-4 MINSHu 572, 777 HANREI JIHO 8 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975).
385. Id., 777 HANREI JIHO at 9.
386. Repeta v. Japan (Repeta case), 43-2 MINSHU 89, 1299 HANREI JIHO 41 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Mar. 8, 1989).
387. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
388. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
389. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152-54.
390. Id. at 152 n.4.
391. Id.
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legislation that restricts spiritual freedom cannot be removed through the
democratic political process. Such legislation must be reviewed under
heightened scrutiny, while the rational basis test should be applied to
economic legislation. The same analysis is applied to legislation that
restricts the rights of minorities.
392
On the other hand, Professor Ashibe argues, Footnote 4 should not
be understood as excluding evaluation of each right's substantive
value. 393 First, he explains that the first paragraph of Footnote 4394 is
premised on a substantive value judgment with respect to protected
rights, independent from their functions in protecting or reinforcing the
democratic political process. 395 Second, Professor Ashibe points out that,
although the first paragraph was added at Chief Justice Hughes's
request, 396 Justice Stone wholly accepted this idea: in Jones v.
Opelika,397 when then-Chief Justice Stone said that the First Amendment
rights occupy a "preferred position" 398 in the constitutional system, he
was engaged in a judgment with respect to the relative substantive value
of those rights.399
Therefore, though Professor Ashibe says the double standard theory
is primarily explained by spiritual freedom's function in protecting the
democratic political process, he admits that the double standard is
secondarily based on the substantive value of spiritual rights. He
supports Professor Laurence H. Tribe's view that constitutions are
392. ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 215.
393. Id. at 216-18. Professor Ashibe also presents, as a basis for the double standard
theory, the Japanese Constitution's principles of representative democracy and a social
welfare state (see, e.g., KENPO [JAPAN CONST.], art. 25 (social rights)), the limitation of
the judicial system in its ability for reviewing economic legislation, and the fact that only
the text of Articles 22 (freedom of occupation) and 29 (property rights), not the articles of
spiritual freedom, explicitly refers to the limitation by the "public welfare." ASHIBE,
KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 225.
394. The first paragraph reads, "There may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." (citation
omitted).
395. ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 216. See Luis Lusky, Footnote
Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1097, 1099-1100
(1982) (arguing that when Chief Justice Hughes suggested to Justice Stone that he add
the first paragraph, he was suggesting that "[s]ome rights ... deserve more judicial
attention than others because they are mentioned in the text of the Constitution, even
though the text, on any fair interpretation, has fallen short of affording the protection the
Court is now asked to provide.").
396. See Lusky, supra note 395, at 1096-1100.
397. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
398. Id. at 608 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
399. ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 217.
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systems of substantive values that hold "human dignity" in their core.400
2. Standard of Judicial Review for the Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment
Professor Ashibe develops the double standard theory in several
respects and this development is generally supported by constitutional
law scholars. First, he applies this theory to protecting the right to self-
determination (which he calls the right to privacy). Footnote 4 of the
Carolene Products Co. case does not mention this right, but Professor
Ashibe argues for protecting this right with heightened scrutiny because
of its substantive value: the right to privacy (self-determination)
lies at the core of the principle of non-violability of one's personhood
(human dignity). ... Only the highest degree of protection for an
individual's personhood and autonomy enables people to realize
themselves and wholly enjoy the protection of spiritual freedom.
[H]ence, in cases where the issue is the alleged violation of the right
to privacy, which involves marriage, procreation, childrearing and
others and which is fundamental to an individual's personal or
autonomous existence, 'strict scrutiny' ('compelling interest' test...
is required, pursuant to spiritual freedom cases.
401
He also argues that privacy interests which are less fundamental still
402 rsCua ic tcnieerequire intermediate scrutiny, and supports Cruzan since it considered
the right to refuse treatment to be one of the protected constitutional
rights that require heightened scrutiny.40 3
Thus, following Professor Ashibe's theory of judicial review based
on U.S. theories and the recognized value of the right to refuse treatment
in the U.S., a governmental infringement on the right to refuse treatment
in Japan should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Under this level of
scrutiny, the government is at least required to show that there is an
important interest, that the means of restrictions substantially furthers the
interest, and that the means is the least restrictive one.
In sum, Professor Ashibe incorporated the two-tier approach of
400. Id. at 224 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-69 (1980)). But see JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1989) (arguing that only those rights that protect the
democratic process and discrete and insular minorities enjoy heightened scrutiny in
judicial review).
401. ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 242. See also Sato, Meaning, supra
note 318, at 20 (the acts of self-determination that are directly connected with one's
personhood require a heightened scrutiny such as that requiring a compelling state
interest).
402. ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 242.
403. Id. at 399-400.
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judicial review developed in U.S case law into Japanese law and
supplemented it. The Japanese Supreme Court, albeit in part, accepted
it.404 Under this widely accepted view, the right to refuse treatment, as a
part of the right to self-determination, can and should be protected with
heightened scrutiny.
C. Application of the Constitutional Right to Refuse Treatment in Japan
1. Case of Jehovah's Witness' Refusal of Blood Transfusion
4°5
In 2000, the Supreme Court of Japan recognized the right to refuse a
blood transfusion under tort law. Despite that the Court did not mention
the Constitution, it clarified that the right to refuse medical treatment is
justified because of its importance for one's personhood. Moreover, the
Court's opinion implies that this right outweighs countervailing
governmental interests.
The patient of ths case was a Jehovah's Witness and suffering from
liver cancer. She was looking for a physician and hospital that would
honor her wish to operate without a blood transfusion even if a
transfusion proved necessary for saving her life. One of the defendant
physicians advised the patient to undergo tests immediately, saying that
the operation could be performed without a blood transfusion if the
malignancy had not yet metastasized. The patient accepted the advice.
While the patient was in the hospital, the physicians recognized the
possibility that the transfusion might be necessary during the operation,
but they did not explain to the patient their hospital's policy that the
transfusion be performed even against the patient's wish if necessary to
save the patient's life. Before the operation, the patient gave the
physicians a waiver that stated that she could not accept blood
transfusion and that she waived her claim for any injury caused by
performing the surgery without blood transfusion. During the operation,
the physicians determined that a transfusion was necessary to save her
life due to hemorrhage, and gave the transfusion.
The Court recognized the patient's right to refuse treatment as a part
of a personhood right under tort law and found the physicians liable. The
Court stated:
[W]hen a patient retains a clear wish of refusal of treatment that
accompanies blood transfusion because it violates her religious
belief, the right to such decision making must be respected as a part
404. See supra notes 379-386 and the accompanying text.
405. Takeda v. Japan (Jehovah's Witness Blood Transfusion case), 54-2 MINSHu 528,
1710 HANREI JIHO 97 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 29, 2000).
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of the personhood right. [The physicians] knew that the patient had
[such a religious belief] and [the patient] had entered [the hospital]
expecting to undergo the operation without blood transfusion-under
such facts in the present case, when the physicians realized that they
could not deny a possibility of facing the situation during the
operation where a blood transfusion is the only way to save her life,
they should have explained to her that [the hospital] has a policy of
giving blood transfusions in such a situation ... and let her decide
whether to stay at [the hospital] and undergo the operation performed
by [the physicians] .406
Although this case involves tort law and the patient's religious
beliefs, one can find significant constitutional implications in this case,
supporting the proposition that in Japan, like America, the right to refuse
medical treatment is protected by its constitution. While the Court did
not explicitly state that the right to refuse treatment is protected by the
Constitution, it declared the right to refuse treatment as a part of
"personhood rights" in tort law doctrine. As discussed above, 407 it is
generally agreed among constitutional law scholars that the Pursuit of
Happiness Clause of Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution consists of
the rights that are essential for one's personhood.4 °8 Hence, if a right is
recognized as essential to one's personhood in tort law doctrine, it is
logically possible to recognize the same interest under the Constitution
against the government. 409  In this case, the patient's refusal was
motivated by her religious belief, but the American cases have protected
patients' refusal regardless of the patient's religious belief.410 Thus, it is
possible to consider that non-religious refusal is equally protected by the
Japanese Constitution.
Additionally, the patient was not terminally ill, 41' but the Court
406. Id., 1710 HANREj JIHO at 99-100.
407. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
408. Isamu Noguchi, Ehoba no Shonin Mudan Yuketsu Sosho to Infomudo-Konsento
no Hori [Jehovah 's Witness Unauthorized Blood Transfusion Case and the Principle of
Informed Consent], 549 HOGAKU SEMINA 65, 66 (2000) (commenting that although the
opinion did not cite certain article of the Constitution, a recognition of the constitutional
value of individual dignity under Article 13 of the Constitution lies at the basis of the
reasoning of this case).
409. See ASHIBE, KENPOGAKU II, supra note 301, at 360-61 (arguing that important
personhood interests protected in private law can and should be protected under Article
13 of the Constitution).
410. The American courts do not distinguish religious and non-religious treatment
and apply the same standard of judicial review to the religious and non-religious refusal
cases. Compare the religious refusal cases, e.g., Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Melideo, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976); Public
Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) with the non-religious
refusal case discussed in Parts II and Il1.
411. She lived for about five years after the treatment. See id. at 99.
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recognized the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Therefore, the
Court's holding is consistent with the American courts' idea that a
competent patient's right to refuse treatment must be protected regardless
of the patient's life-expectancy or prognosis. 4 12 The Japanese Supreme
Court itself did not consider the patient's diagnosis or life-expectancy or
other objective elements when it held that her right to refuse treatment
should have been honored.4 13
A commentator argues that the Jehovah's Witness Blood
Transfusion case recognized the right to refuse medical treatment only as
a religious right and its scope is limited to religious refusal.4 14 This
understanding is too narrow. The Japanese Supreme Court did not
discuss a distinctive nature of the religion-based refusal of treatment.
Moreover, as seen above, cases in the U.S. have not distinguished
between religious- and nonreligious-based convictions with respect to
refusal of treatment. It is because a competent person's refusal of life-
sustaining treatment has sufficient value as autonomy in authoring one's
life and bodily freedom to warrant protection under the Constitution that
a person does not need to have a religious conviction to gain
constitutional protection and invoke heightened scrutiny against
restrictions that impair such decision making.
As seen below, mainstream criminal law theories are much less
receptive to honoring a competent patient's wishes than this case. The
rest of this article will examine the consistency between the
constitutional right to refuse treatment and the views of Japanese lower
courts and criminal law scholars over the interpretation of criminal law
involving the decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment.
2. Tokai University Case
In Japan, no health care provider has been indicted for honoring a
patient's refusal of lifesaving treatment and withholding or withdrawing
the treatment.41 5  However, in the Tokai University case,4 16 a district
412. See supra Part III.B.1.
413. Moreover, the Court never implied that the refusal of lifesaving treatment is an
attempted suicide or that a physician or hospital's respect for a patient's refusal and the
resulting death ruin ethical integrity of medical profession.
414. Yoshio Shiomi, "Ehoba no Shonin " Shinja Yuketsu Kyohi Sosho Jiken [Case on
"Jehovah's Witness" Believer's Refusal of Blood Transfusion], 1202 JURISUTO 66, 68
(2001).
415. In contrast, there were criminal cases involving active euthanasia in lower courts
and they have suggested that active euthanasia might be allowed in extreme
circumstances under criminal law. See Euthanasia case, 15-9 KOKEISHU 674, 324
HANREI JIHO 11 (Nagoya High Ct., Dec. 22, 1962). The court noted a controversial
standard for allowing euthanasia: euthanasia is allowed only when (1) the patient is
suffering an incurable disease and death is imminent; (2) physical pain is so severe that
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court mentioned, in dicta, the requirements for allowing a decision to
forego life-sustaining treatment under criminal law.
The case involved a physician's active termination of the life of a
terminally-ill patient, whose death was imminent, because of persistent
requests by the patient's son. The 58-year-old male patient was suffering
cancer but, according to the family members' requests, had not been
informed of disease or life-expectancy. Five days before his death, he
became half-conscious, and because he tried to remove a feeding tube
and drip infusion, his limbs were bound. On the morning of the day of
his death, his family members requested the removal of the tube and
infusion, and the defendant physician honored the request. In the
evening, a family member who could not bear the sight of the patient's
labored breathing demanded repeatedly and persistently that the
defendant end the patient's life. The defendant finally injected
potassium chloride and verapamil hydrochloride into the patient, who
died eleven minutes later.
The prosecutor indicted the defendant only for this deadly injection,
not for his other activities such as withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.
The court convicted him of murder and sentenced him to two years'
imprisonment with two year's probation.417
In dicta, the court set forth circumstances in which the decision to
forego life-sustaining treatments would be honored. Foregoing life-
sustaining treatment is allowed when (1) the patient is suffering an
incurable disease and is in a terminal situation where there is no
expectation of recovery,418 and (2) there is the patient's expressed wish
of foregoing treatment at the very moment of foregoing the treatment, or
there is the patient's wish that can be found by the family members who
know the patient well and have communicated with him or her.419 The
nobody can bear looking at the patient's suffering; (3) the purpose of the termination of
life is to relieve the pain; (4) there is a request or consent of the patient if he is competent;
(5) termination of life is performed by a physician unless there is a special reason; (6) the
manner of terminating life is ethical. Id., 324 HANREI JIHO at 13. This standard was
followed by the district court cases cited as 808 HANREI JIHO 112 (Kagoshima Dist. Ct.,
Oct. 1, 1970); 808 HANREI JIHO 113 (Kobe Dist. Ct., Oct. 29, 1970); 879 HANREI JIHO
158 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Nov. 30, 1977); 1363 HANREI JIHO 160 (Kochi Dist. Ct., Sep. 17,
1991). But none of these cases acquitted the defendant. Japan v. Tokunaga (Tokai
University case), 1530 HANREI JIHO 28 (Yokohama Dist. Ct., May 28, 1995) modified
this standard: Euthanasia is allowed only when (1) the patient is suffering severe physical
pain; (2) the patient's death is unavoidable and his death is imminent; (3) there is no
alternative to alleviate the patient's physical pain; (4) there is an explicit consent of the
patient. Id. at 38-40.
416. 1530 HANREI JIHO 28 (Yokohama Dist. Ct., May 28, 1995).
417. The family member who demanded the defendant physician to terminate the
patient's life was not indicted.
418. Tokai University, 1530 HANREI JIHO at 36.
419. Id. at 37.
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court also added that all treatment can be foregone including nutrition
and hydration. 420  The court explained that the reason the patient's
terminal condition is required is that otherwise it would possibly cause "a
general climate of undervaluing life."
4 2
'
3. Problems of Tokai University and Criminal Law Theories in
Japan
There are at least three major problems with the Tokai University
analysis. First, unlike American courts which first discuss a competent
person's right to refuse treatment and then deal with issues unique to
incompetent patients, the court in Tokai University tried to set conditions
for allowing forgoing treatment applicable to both competents and
incompetents, without considering the nature and scope of a competent
person's right to refuse treatment. While the court mentioned "the idea
of self-determination,, 422 the court did not treat it as an important
individual right that controls interpretation of criminal law, but rather
mentioned it as if it were merely one of the several factors to consider
and is easily overridden by some governmental interests. This problem
leads to the second and third problems.
The second problem in the opinion of Tokai University regarding
the right to refuse treatment lies in the requirement that the patient be in a
terminal condition. The court set this requirement without distinguishing
between competent and incompetent people.
A governmental committee report also required that a patient's
condition be terminal. One year before the Tokai University case, the
Special Committee of Death and Medical Treatment of the Science
Council of Japan (a committee that advices the government consisting of
scholars from various fields) issued a report on foregoing life-sustaining
treatment. The report found that "based on the principle of informed
consent, which is the starting point of medical treatment, the way of
living or ending one's life which the patient chooses should be
respected. 423 The report then discusses competent patients' foregoing of
treatment. It says, "[S]ince the legal principle of informed consent
governs in medical treatment, when a terminal competent patient refuses
life-prolonging treatment, the physicians should be subject to the
420. Id. at 38.
421. Id.at36-37.
422. Id. at 39.
423. NIHON GAKUJUTSU KAIGI, SHI TO IRYO TOKUBETSU IINKAI [SPECIAL COMMITTEE
OF DEATH AND MEDICAL TREATMENT, THE SCIENCE COUNCIL OF JAPAN], SONGENSHI NI
TSUITE [ON DEATH WITH DIGNITY] (1994), reprinted in 1061 JulusuTo 70, 71 (1995)
[hereinafter Committee Report].
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patient's intent even though it hastens death., 424 The Committee Report
went on to discuss medical integrity and the difference between
attempted suicide and refusal of life-sustaining treatment. It correctly
says, "[I]f there is a patient's request, foregoing life-prolonging treatment
is not against the ethics of physicians. ... Foregoing life-prolonging
treatment is a measure for allowing a natural death to occur, and,
therefore, such death is not suicide or homicide by a physician."
' 425
However, the Committee Report suggests that both a competent and
incompetent patient's refusal should be honored when the patient is in a
terminal situation. The Report does not adequately explain this
limitation.
Commentators support the requirement that the patients' conditions
be terminal. For example, Professor Oya, who drafted this committee
report, argues that the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment is
allowed only when the competent patient is terminal and has no
possibility of recovery, 426 even though he agrees that there is
constitutional protection of the right to refuse treatment and he
recognizes the importance of a competent person's right prior to a
consideration of the issues presented by incompetent people.427 He
explains that this restriction is necessary because of the importance of
respecting human life.428 Other leading scholars in criminal law suggest
that the permissible circumstances should even more narrowly be limited
to those in which the patient's death is imminent.429
This requirement is too narrow to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The American courts since Quinlan have consistently found that the state
interest in preserving life cannot outweigh patients' constitutional right
to refuse treatment regardless of their life-expectancy or prognosis. As
Professor Oya says, the interest in protecting life is unquestionably very
important. However, the American cases have clarified that, at least for
competent persons, the importance of the constitutional right to refuse
treatment generally outweighs the importance of the governmental
interest in preserving the patient's life. Moreover, the Japanese Supreme
Court in the above Jehovah's Witness Blood Transfusion case confirmed
the principle that a competent person's right prevails regardless of life-
expectancy. Therefore, as for competent patients, their right to refuse
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. OYA, supra note 339, at 164.
427. Id. at 156-57.
428. Id. at 164.
429. KENICHI NAKAYAMA, ANRAKUSHI TO SONGENSHI [EUTHANASIA AND DEATH WITH
DIGNITY] 156 (2000); Ken Naito, Anrakushi, Songenshi to Keiho [Euthanasia, Death
with Dignity and Criminal Law], 17 DAITO HOGAKU 187, 200-01 (1990).
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treatment under the Japanese Constitution must generally be sustained
regardless of life-expectancy.43 ° Competent persons should have a final
say regarding when to forgo their own treatment, not the government.
Third, the Tokai University court's justification for requiring the
patient's condition to be terminal is not satisfactory. The court explained
that such a requirement is necessary because allowing the foregoing of
life-sustaining treatment for non-terminal patients, including competent
people, might cause a "general climate of undervaluing life."'43' Here,
the court gave no explanation for what this climate might be or the
likelihood that it might occur. Neither did it explain any possible causal
relationship between honoring non-terminal patients' refusal of life-
sustaining treatment and this putative climate.432 A constitutional right
that invokes heightened scrutiny requires the government to show at least
an important governmental interest and its substantial connection with
the governmental restriction of the constitutional right. A hypothetical,
abstract interest cannot be a recognizable important governmental
interest. Or even assuming it can, one cannot find a substantial, not
remote, relationship between a hypothetical fear and the governmental
restriction. Moreover, even if a court found such a relationship, the
government would still have to show that a total ban of non-terminal
patients' refusal is a minimum means to further the important
governmental interest.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's Jehovah's Witness Blood
Transfusion case did not take the same approach as the district court in
Tokai University: the Supreme Court recognized a patient's right to
refuse treatment when the patient is not in terminate condition. Indeed,
there seems no argument that this Supreme Court case has caused a
"general climate of undervaluing life."
4. Physicians' Duty to Treat the Patient Regardless of the
Patient's Choice
The Tokai University court set a patient's terminal condition as a
requirement for allowing foregoing treatment, explaining that the
physician's legal duty lasts until the patient's disease becomes
430. See TATEYAMA, supra note 336, at 26 (arguing that there is no necessity at all to
limit the foregoing life-sustaining treatment to terminal patients as long as the patient's
wish is clear).
431. Tokai University, 1539HANREIJIHOat37.
432. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223 ("In cases that do not involve the protection of the
actual or potential life of someone other than the decision maker, the state's indirect and
abstract interest in preserving the life of the competent patient generally gives way to the
patient's much stronger personal interest in directing the course of his own life.").
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terminal. 4 This view has received support among the leading
commentators.434
In the case of competent persons, however, the court's requirement
of a terminal condition, and its justification based upon the physician's
legal duty to treat, would be in conflict with the Constitution. The court
treated a patient's right to self-determination and the physician's duty to
treat as different and independent factors that need to be weighed. This
is an incorrect understanding of the nature of the physicians' duty; when
the patient is competent, the physician's duty to treat should disappear at
the moment when the patient refuses the treatment. When the patient is
competent, a physician has a duty to treat only as far as the patient
accepts.435
A physician's duty to treat under the criminal law is surely based
upon the government's important interest in preservation of life. As
discussed above,436 however, this governmental interest cannot supersede
a competent person's constitutional right to refuse treatment just because
the patient is not in a terminal condition.437
In conclusion, the Constitution of Japan, like the U.S. Constitution,
protects the right to refuse medical treatment. The constitutional right to
refuse treatment requires that a governmental intrusion into this right
pass heightened scrutiny of judicial review. Under the Japanese
Constitution, a competent person's refusal of treatment, including life-
sustaining treatment, should generally outweigh the important state
interest in preserving life, regardless of life expectancy. A physician's
duty to treat patients should disappear at a competent patient's refusal.
The interpretations of statutes regarding foregoing of life-sustaining
treatment should be developed following the constitutional requirements.
433. Tokai University, 1530 HANREI JIHO at 36-37.
434. NAKAYAMA, supra note 429, at 154; Naito, supra note 429, at 200-01 (stating
that physicians' duty to treat disappears when the patient is in terminal condition and
there is consent of a patient).
435. See KAI, supra note 338, at 209, 281 (stating that a physician's duty to treat
disappears with a patient's wish). See also Yoshihiko Nakamori, Ishi no Shinryo Hikiuke
Gimu han to Keiji Sekinin [Physicians' Duty to Undertake Medical Treatment and
Criminal Responsibilities], 91 HOGAKU RONSO 1, 1 (1972) ("One of the most important
occupational duties of a physician is to treat sick persons ... at their request." (emphasis
added)).
436. See supra Part III.B.1.
437. Foregoing artificial nutrition and hydration is being recognized in Japan. Tokai
University and the commission included them. The Japan Medical Association's
guideline for physicians' professional ethics does not prohibit foregoing artificial
nutrition and hydration. JAPAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ISHI NO SHOKUGYO RINRI SHISHIN
[GUIDELINE OF PHYSICIANS' PROFESSIONAL ETHICS] 21 (2004), available in Japanese at
http://www.med.or.jp/nichikara/syokurin.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2006).
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V. Conclusion
This article has shown that in both the United States and Japan the
right to refuse medical treatment is an important constitutional right. The
right to refuse treatment deserves constitutional protection because of the
moral value in autonomy in authoring one's own life and bodily freedom.
Government restrictions of the right to refuse treatment require
heightened scrutiny by the courts, and under such scrutiny, a competent
person's right generally outweighs state interests, including the interest
in preservation of life. The American courts have paved the way for the
constitutional protection of individual autonomy in their own body and
most personal end of life choices. It is time for Japanese courts to
similarly take a stand for establishing the right to refuse medical
treatment as a concrete constitutional norm.

